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Destined for an Epic Fail: The Problematic 
Guantánamo Military Commissions 
DAVID GLAZIER* 
“It’s true that in response to widespread criticism and legal sanction from the 
Supreme Court, the military commissions system has improved. . . . But just 
because the military commissions have gotten better, doesn’t make their use 
lawful or smart . . . .”1 
- Rear Admiral John Hutson, former Navy Judge Advocate General 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The decision to treat the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks as an act of war 
had real legal ramifications permitting, for example, the trial of at least some 
suspected terrorists for war crimes.2 The government promptly seized this 
opportunity, announcing the use of military commissions—common law war 
courts traditionally used to fill gaps in statutory legal coverage3—for this 
purpose.4 But, unlike the past eras in which they were used, military 
commissions can no longer be unregulated ad hoc proceedings. Today, 
minimum fair trial standards are mandated by both international law5 and the 
Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA),6 and trials will receive critical 
scrutiny via both direct and collateral judicial review.7 This Article provides the 
most comprehensive critique of trials under the MCA to date, arguing that the 
Guantánamo tribunals still fall short of applicable legal standards with respect 
                                                                                                                       
 2 See id. 
 3 Erika Myers, Conquering Peace: Military Commissions as a Lawfare Strategy in the 
Mexican War, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 201, 206 (2008). 
 4 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. § 918.1(e) (2002). 
 5 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 354–72 (2005). 
 6 Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948(a)–950(t) (2012). 
 7 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
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to both procedural and substantive law, and will predictably continue to fail 
federal judicial challenges.8  
The commissions’ failings are not just legal. Their use hinders, rather than 
helps, America’s efforts to prevail against terrorist adversaries. This conflict is 
essentially a counter-insurgency; ultimate success requires winning the “hearts 
and minds” of potential supporters to undermine the terrorists’ ability to recruit 
fighters and raise funds.9 The use of substandard military tribunals trying only 
nationals of countries lacking the political will or clout to exempt their citizens 
is thus doomed to fail politically. As admitted al Qaeda member Ali Hamza 
Ahmed Suleiman al Bahlul boldly declared after his 2008 Guantánamo 
“conviction,” “the military court[ ] that tried me today will speed up . . . the 
support of people for us . . . .”10 
Flaws in the commissions’ application of substantive law are even more 
serious than their procedural shortcomings. The government essentially treats 
military commission and Article III jurisdiction as fungible, making tribunal 
selection discretionary.11 But, this ignores law of war rules and Supreme Court 
precedent confining commission jurisdiction to circumstances and offenses 
absent from most Guantánamo cases.12 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) has now invalidated the widely 
used “providing material support for terrorism” charge (as well as solicitation) 
while returning a challenge to conspiracy for further review by a three judge 
panel.13 These decisions invalidate seven of the eight commission convictions 
to date in whole or in part.14 But, this Article argues that all the completed cases 
had fatal flaws, meaning the commissions have failed in every prosecution so 
far.  
Major pending cases—the capital trials of alleged USS Cole bombing 
mastermind Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu al Nashiri, and alleged 
9/11 planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammad and four co-conspirators—have 
substantial, if not fatal, flaws as well. Some charged conduct took place outside 
the scope of any armed conflict although conflict nexus is a necessary 
precondition for law of war jurisdiction.15 Some conduct violates federal law 
                                                                                                                       
 8 Failures to date include: Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567; al Bahlul v. United States, No. 
11-1324, 2014 WL 3437485, at *21 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2014) (en banc) (confirming the 
invalidity of providing material support to terrorism and solicitation charges while returning 
constitutional challenges to a conspiracy charge to a three-judge panel); Hamdan v. United 
States (Hamdan II), 696 F.3d 1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by al Bahlul v. United 
States, No. 11-1324, 2014 WL 3437485, at *5 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2014) (en banc). 
 9 DAVID J. KILCULLEN, COUNTERINSURGENCY 185–216 (2010). 
 10 Official Authenticated Transcript at 967, United States v. al Bahlul, TRANS 
(Military Comm’ns Trial Judiciary May 7, 2008). 
 11 See infra Part II. 
 12 See infra Part II. 
 13 See al Bahlul, 2014 WL 3437485, at *21. 
 14 See infra Part II.A. 
 15 See infra Part II.B. 
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but not the law of war.16 All Guantánamo charges fail to distinguish between 
the robust set of international armed conflict rules and the lesser set of non-
international conflict regulations even while the government generally holds 
itself accountable only for complying with the latter.17 Meanwhile, military 
tribunal use effectively obligates the defense to make law of war unique 
arguments, such as contending that the Pentagon and World Trade Center were 
lawful targets18 and that civilian lives lost on 9/11 were mere “collateral 
damage,” not murders,19 which will inflict further pain on the victims’ families. 
These issues can all be avoided just by using federal charges in Article III 
courts.  
Claims that the commissions offer legitimate practical advantages over 
Article III trials are also mistaken. President Obama has said that “[m]ilitary 
commissions . . . allow for the protection of sensitive sources and methods of 
intelligence-gathering; they allow for the safety and security of participants; and 
for the presentation of evidence gathered from the battlefield that cannot always 
be effectively presented in federal courts.”20 But these assertions are 
misleading. Battlefield evidence collection, like any overseas evidence 
gathering, is exempt from Fourth Amendment mandates.21 Commission rules 
for classified evidence are based on the Classified Information Procedures Act 
(CIPA)22 that have been applied by Article III courts in dozens of terrorism 
cases since 9/11.23 So the commissions have no legitimate advantage in either 
of these respects. But the evident intelligence agency role at Guantánamo, 
classification of detainee statements, and liberal hearsay rules suggest that the 
commissions have the illegitimate purpose of facilitating use of evidence 
obtained through coercion while screening Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
personnel from exposure or criminal liability. While the MCA categorically 
bars evidence obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
                                                                                                                       
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 See infra Part II.E. 
 18 See infra Part V.C.1. 
 19 See infra Part V.C.2. 
 20 Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on National Security 
(May 21, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-
On-National-Security-5-21-09, archived at http://perma.cc/RE4U-4896. 
 21 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
 22 MCA 2009 rules are patterned on CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app., and declare that “[t]he 
judicial construction of the Classified Information Procedures Act . . . shall be authoritative 
in the interpretation of this subchapter . . . [except where] inconsistent with the specific 
requirements of this chapter.” 10 U.S.C. § 949p-1(d) (2012). 
 23 CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2011, at 13, http://www.lawandsecurity.org/ 
Portals/0/Documents/Issue.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) [hereinafter TERRORIST TRIAL 
REPORT CARD], archived at http://perma.cc/FF4D-JXVU.  
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treatment,24 commission practice suggests that the Guantánamo tribunals are 
not fully obeying this statutory command.25 
Paradoxically, the commissions will be the least efficient of all possible 
trial forums in terms of the time required to reach final judgments. Commission 
proceedings advance fitfully at best. Although President Bush demanded 
Congress pass the initial MCA in the fall of 2006 so that families of 9/11 
victims “should have to wait no longer” for justice,26 the earliest possible start 
of the alleged 9/11 conspirators’ trial is now early 2015,27 more than 3,000 days 
since Bush’s call for action, although even that is likely overly optimistic.28 
Even then, the commissions’ unique jurisdiction and procedure will be litigated 
for years. Al Nashiri’s case had already seen 227 motions briefed to the trial 
judge by February 2014,29 yet was still at least a year away from actual trial.30 
Conservative critics portrayed the 2010 federal conspiracy conviction of 
former CIA detainee Ahmed Ghailani as a near acquittal after the jury declined 
to convict him for murder,31 implying that civilian trials pose a significant risk 
of setting actual terrorists free. But it is the Guantánamo tribunals, not the 
federal courts, which pose the real risk of failure. Ghailani was tried, convicted, 
sentenced to life in prison, had his appeal rejected by the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, and his petition for certiorari denied by the Supreme Court,32 all 
while the ongoing Guantánamo cases still languished in pre-trial hearings. 
                                                                                                                       
 24 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a) (2012). 
 25 See Some Key Facts on Military Commissions v. Federal Courts, HUM. RTS. FIRST 
(Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/some-key-facts-military-
commissions-v-federal-courts, archived at http://perma.cc/FJC5-9V3Z. 
 26 Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military 
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XXV7-C25M. 
 27 See Chief Prosecutor Seeks January 2015 Start for 9/11 Trial, ALTERNET, 
http://www.alternet.org/progressive-wire/chief-prosecutor-seeks-january-2015-start-911-trial 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4J3P-T9TZ. 
 28 See, e.g., Ryan J. Reilly, FBI Infiltration of Gitmo Defense Team Tosses 9/11 Trial 
into Disarray, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/17/fbi-
guantanamo_n_5167296.html (last updated Apr. 18, 2014, 11:59 AM), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7M6A-F3EL. 
 29 Matt Danzer, Statement of Chief Prosecutor on Pre-Trial Motions in Al-Nashiri 
Case, LAWFARE (Feb. 26, 2014, 4:04 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/ statement-
of-chief-prosecutor-on-pre-trial-motions-in-al-nashiri-case/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
V4GL-NGTU. 
 30 See Carol Rosenberg, USS Cole Case Judge Names Air Force Successor, MIAMI 
HERALD (July 10, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/07/10/4229237/guantanamo-
judge-steps-down-from.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LP2F-62DH. 
 31 See Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/ 
nyregion/26ghailani.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CUU8-DQHF. 
 32 See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1523 (2014). 
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Part II of this Article briefly reviews historical military commission 
employment and identifies key jurisdictional limitations including temporal 
constraints on prosecution and the required nexus with hostilities. 
Part III considers both the legal and practical criteria for conducting a “fair” 
trial that a “legitimate” commission would need to meet. 
Part IV examines several residual post-MCA procedural concerns. It will 
show how issues such as the excessive authority concentrated in the hands of 
the convening authority, practical denial of the right to counsel of choice, 
systemic inequalities between prosecution and defense, and abuses of 
classification authority all serve to undermine the trials’ legitimacy. 
Part V uses the charges levied against three Obama-era defendants—Omar 
Khadr, who pleaded guilty in 2010, and the pending capital cases of al Nashiri 
and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad—to analyze substantive legal issues with the 
commissions. Most charges have real issues with law of war compliance or 
limits on military jurisdiction. These cases also risk creating legal precedents 
that could redound to U.S. detriment, facilitating future attacks on our military 
and foreign prosecutions of American officials. While the 9/11 charges have a 
firmer foundation than the others, the government’s approach still raises issues 
avoided by a regular federal trial. 
Despite recent bipartisan support and procedural improvements, legal flaws 
continue to undermine the commissions’ credibility. Their continued use under 
a president who admitted that “Guantánamo set back the moral authority that is 
America’s strongest currency in the world”33 is contrary to both law and overall 
U.S. national interests. 
 
II. THE ORIGINS AND LIMITS OF MILITARY COMMISSION JURISDICTION 
A. Military Commission Origins and Judicial Review 
Military commission proponents often seek to enhance their credibility by 
asserting historical precedents dating back to the Revolution.34 But, military 
commissions were actually created by General Winfield Scott during the 
Mexican War of 1846–1848 for reasons anticipating modern counter-
insurgency doctrine.35 Scott planned a bold offensive, marching his 
outnumbered invasion force inland from Vera Cruz to capture Mexico City.36 
Lacking sufficient forces to continuously garrison a supply line back to the 
coast, he needed general Mexican acquiescence to his army’s presence in order 
to procure needed provisions along his march and avoid the kind of popular 
                                                                                                                       
 33 Press Release, The White House, supra note 20. 
 34 See, e.g., id.  
 35 See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military 
Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 31–40 (2005). 
 36 Id. 
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uprising that had hamstrung Napoleon’s forces in Spain.37 Scott thus recognized 
the need to win the locals’ “minds and feelings.”38 Unruly conduct by American 
troops threatened this objective, but the statutory Articles of War only permitted 
courts-martial for military offenses such as desertion, leaving no means to 
repress common crimes.39 Scott resolved this problem by invoking law of war 
authority to impose “martial law” in occupied territory and try crimes 
committed by, or against, his troops before military commissions, which he 
based on court-martial practice.40 
Commissions saw wider use during the American Civil War, being used in 
more than 4,000 cases.41 They were addressed in statutes for the first time and 
given the same post-trial review as courts-martial.42 Commissions were not 
legally mandated to follow any specific procedural rules, although in practice 
they continued to mirror courts-martial.43 This conflict also saw commissions’ 
first judicial challenges. The Supreme Court held that they were not part of the 
judicial structure created by Article III, and federal courts thus lacked direct 
review authority.44 The Court had reached the same conclusion regarding 
courts-martial six years earlier.45 But, it confirmed the availability of collateral 
review and rejected martial law trials when civilian courts were open in its 
famous 1866 Ex parte Milligan decision.46 Milligan also established the modern 
military jurisdictional nomenclature, calling tribunals in occupied enemy 
territory “military government courts,” and reserving “martial law” to describe 
the exercise of military authority within the army’s own national territory.47 
Military commissions figured prominently during the counterinsurgency 
which followed Spain’s 1898 cession of the Philippines to the United States.48 
Commissions tried both serious common crimes as well as law of war cases 
until the establishment of a civilian territorial government in 1902.49 They 
continued to hew to court-martial standards, including faithful application of 
U.S. common law rules of evidence.50 
                                                                                                                       
 37 David Glazier, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation and the 
U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 121, 139–43 (2005). 
 38 See DAVID A. CLARY, EAGLES AND EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES, MEXICO, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR A CONTINENT 303 (2009). 
 39 See Glazier, supra note 37, at 140. 
 40 Id. at 140–41. 
 41 See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY 168–73 (1991). 
 42 David Glazier, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century 
Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005, 2043 (2003). 
 43 Id. at 2042–44. 
 44 Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 252 (1863). 
 45 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 74 (1857). 
 46 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 66–93 (1866). 
 47 See 2 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS *1245 (tracing the term 
“military government” to Chief Justice Chase’s Ex parte Milligan opinion).  
 48 Glazier, supra note 35, at 47–48. 
 49 Id. at 49–50. 
 50 Id. at 47–56.  
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It was only in World War II that military commissions deliberately departed 
from court-martial standards. In 1942, eight Nazi saboteurs landed on the U.S. 
East Coast and were arrested by the FBI after one turned traitor.51 The 
government scrambled to come up with an effective way to try them.52 
Ultimately the President approved Attorney General Francis Biddle’s proposal 
to employ a military commission which was allowed to make their own rules of 
procedure.53 The presidential order purported to foreclose judicial review, but 
the Supreme Court assembled for a special summer term to consider the 
saboteurs’ habeas case, styled Ex parte Quirin.54 The Court upheld the 
commission’s law of war jurisdiction, including authority to try U.S. citizens. 
But, just by meeting, the Court repudiated presidential foreclosure of judicial 
review;55 it did not address commission procedure.56 Martial law employment 
of military commissions in Hawaii, in contrast, was overruled in Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku.57 
Although historically overshadowed by the International Military Tribunals 
at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the United States conducted thousands of military 
trials in the interim between the Axis military surrenders and the formal 
conclusion of peace treaties.58 These tribunals sat both as military government 
courts in occupied Germany and Japan, and as law of war tribunals throughout 
the European and Pacific theaters.59 The Supreme Court upheld both the 
military government trial of an American civilian dependent60 and law of war 
military commissions sitting in the Philippines61 and China.62  
Military commissions were then largely forgotten until 9/11 when Bush 
Administration lawyers dusted off Quirin, ignoring significant developments in 
international criminal law in the intervening decades.63 After a rocky start that 
saw several prosecutors reassigned after voicing ethical concerns and a chief 
                                                                                                                       
 51 See LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL 25–42 (2003). 
 52 Id. at 46–49. 
 53 See id. at 50–53. 
 54 David Glazier, The Development of an Exceptional Court: The History of the 
American Military Commission, in GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND 37, 49–50 (Fionnuala Ni 
Aoláin & Oren Gross eds., 2013). 
 55 Id. at 49–51. 
 56 See FISHER, supra note 51, at 109–13.  
 57 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946). 
 58 FRANK M. BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946–
1955, at 51 (1989) (documenting U.S. trials of 1672 Germans); PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE 
JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945–1951, at 48 
(1979) (documenting U.S. trials of 1409 Japanese defendants); Glazier, supra note 42, at 
2063 n.259. 
 59 See Glazier, supra note 42, at 2062–73. 
 60 Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 342–43 (1952). 
 61 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1946). 
 62 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950). 
 63 JESS BRAVIN, THE TERROR COURTS 38–39, 60–63 (2013). 
2014] MILITARY COMMISSIONS’ EPIC FAIL 911 
 
prosecutor fired before the first trial got underway,64 the Supreme Court halted 
the proceedings in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld for violating both the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.65 Because 
Hamdan was based on statutory and treaty interpretation, it was amenable to 
legislative remedy. Congress responded with the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, authorizing tribunal use subject to procedural improvements and 
establishing direct appellate review.66 
The first Guantánamo “conviction” was Australian David Hicks’s March 
2007 guilty plea to providing material support for terrorism.67 Hicks, like all 
those who subsequently accepted plea deals, was required to renounce any right 
to appeal.68 The second case, and first actual trial, was that of Salim Hamdan, 
who was convicted of providing material support for terrorism.69 In the final 
military commission of the Bush presidency, Ali Hamza Ahmed Suleiman al 
Bahlul was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy, 
providing material support for terrorism, and solicitation to commit murder.70 
He refused to mount a defense after being denied representation by counsel of 
his own nationality or the fallback of self-representation.71 
After President Obama decided to resume commission use under his 
Administration, Congress enacted the MCA 2009,72 making modest tweaks to 
the 2006 iteration.73 The commissions have subsequently resolved five more 
cases, all by pleas. Ibrahim al Qosi pleaded guilty to conspiracy and providing 
                                                                                                                       
 64 See id. at 134–42. 
 65 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (plurality opinion).  
 66 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), 
amended by Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948(a)–950(t) (2012). 
 67 First Gitmo Conviction Invalidated by New Ruling, Attorneys Say, CTR. FOR CONST. 
RTS. (Aug. 20, 2014), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/first-gitmo-conviction-
invalidated-new-ruling,-attorneys-say, archived at http://perma.cc/MD9A-NR7L. 
 68  See, e.g., Josh White, Australian’s Plea Deal Was Negotiated Without Prosecutors, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at A7, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/31/AR2007033100976.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NA7F-
L87Y. 
 69 See Joe McMillan, The United States on Trial, in THE GUANTÁNAMO LAWYERS 178 
(Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009). 
 70 William Glaberson, Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2008, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/washington/04gitmo.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/MY6S-RFWK. 
 71 See Official Authenticated Transcript at 56, 73, United States v. al Bahlul, TRANS 
(Military Comm’ns Trial Judiciary Aug. 26, 2004 & Jan. 11, 2006); David Frakt, Guest 
Post: David J. R. Frakt on the Al-Bahlul Amicus Brief, OPINIO JURIS (July 28, 2013, 12:51 
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/07/28/guest-post-david-j-r-frakt-on-the-al-bahlul-amicus-
brief/, archived at http://perma.cc/L8B6-SJEV. 
 72 JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 
2009 (MCA 2009): OVERVIEW AND LEGAL ISSUES 3 (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41163.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PHY7-GE3C. 
 73 For a comparison of the 2006 and 2009 MCA versions, see id. at 36–55. 
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material support to terrorism.74 Omar Khadr accepted a deal requiring him to 
admit to conspiracy, material support for terrorism, spying, and both murder 
and attempted murder “in violation of the law of war.”75 Noor Uthman 
Mohammed pleaded to conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism, 
and agreed to testify against unspecified detainees.76 Majid Khan pleaded guilty 
to the same five charges as Omar Khadr.77 Finally, Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed 
Haza al Darbi pleaded guilty to attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, 
hazarding a vessel, and terrorism, all relating to a 2002 attack on the French 
tanker MV Limburg despite questions as to whether this attack fell within the 
commissions’ lawful jurisdiction.78 
Because the federal courts are open and U.S. occupation of Iraq and 
Afghanistan ended with the establishment of internationally recognized 
governments, both martial law and military government employment are 
foreclosed today. The Guantánamo commissions are thus restricted to the law of 
war role.79 While federal courts enjoy broad authority with a wide range of 
potential charges,80 Supreme Court precedents establish important limits on law 
of war commission jurisdiction. But, there are other jurisdictional issues, such 
as temporal limits and nexus to armed conflict that further undermine the 
validity of pending cases. 
                                                                                                                       
 74 Jane Sutton, U.S. Cuts Prison Sentence for bin Laden’s Cook, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 
2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41508557/ns/us_news-security/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/E5YQ-Y2RE. 
 75 Andrew Mayeda & Janice Tibbetts, Khadr Admits War Crimes in Plea Deal at 
Guantanamo, CANADA.COM (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.canada.com/news/Khadr+ 
admits+crimes+plea+deal+Guantanamo/3721762/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
LP3N-4NCL. 
 76 Carol Rosenberg, Sudanese War Criminal Turns Government Witness, MIAMI 
HERALD (Feb. 18, 2011), http://miamiherald.com/2011/02/18/2074391/sudanese-war-
criminal-at-guantanamo.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NFH9-JWZP.  
 77 Peter Finn, Guantánamo Detainee Majid Khan Pleads Guilty, Promises 
Cooperation, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/guantanamo-detainee-majid-khan-pleads-guilty-promises-
cooperation/2012/02/29/gIQAVuIaiR_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/55FS-3UUQ. 
 78 See Charlie Savage, Guantánamo Detainee Pleads Guilty in 2002 Attack on Tanker 
off Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2014, at A7, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/us/guantanamo-detainee-ahmed-muhammed-haza-al-
darbi.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AY64-NKKW; Referred Charges Dated 2/5/2014, 
United States v. al Darbi, Charge Sheet (Military Comm’ns Trial Judiciary Dec. 16, 2013). 
The charge sheet identifies a fifth charge of “attempt” related to hazarding a vessel and 
terrorism without specifying any intended targets. Id. at 10. 
 79 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 80 “Jihadist” terrorism defendants have been charged under at least 156 different federal 
statutes. See TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 23, at 13. 
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B. Time of War 
The MCA ambiguously declares that the commissions can try defined 
offenses whether they took place “before, on, or after September 11, 2001.”81 
But, it also requires that conduct be “in the context of and associated with 
hostilities.”82 Supreme Court precedent is clearer, explicitly limiting 
commission jurisdiction to periods of hostilities.83 The Court held in In Re 
Yamashita, for example, that jurisdiction exists only “so long as a state of war 
exists—from its declaration until peace is proclaimed.”84 This calls into real 
question jurisdiction over any conduct taking place before the September 18, 
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 85 enactment, or at 
least before the precipitating events of 9/11. 
The commissions’ legal authority to sit ends with hostilities as well. This 
issue arose with the original commission use during the Mexican War. An 
American committed murder in Mexico but escaped military control until peace 
was concluded.86 The government reluctantly determined that he could not be 
punished at all.87 Regular U.S. courts lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction; murder 
was not an offense in the Articles of War, precluding court-martial; and military 
commission jurisdiction was held to end with hostilities,88 a conclusion 
reaffirmed by Yamashita a century later.89 
There is no realistic prospect of a peace agreement with al Qaeda. But there 
is debate about its viability after a decade of U.S. military action, including 
intervention in Afghanistan, drone strikes, and the killing of Osama bin 
Laden.90 An effective cessation of violence resulting from a lack of targets for 
U.S. strikes and absence of al Qaeda attacks should legally end the conflict.91 
Congressional repeal of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
should also legally terminate hostilities. These possibilities counsel against 
assuming the continuing availability of commission prosecutions, a matter of 
particular concern given the glacial progress of the most significant cases. 
                                                                                                                       
 81 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2012). 
 82 Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (2012). 
 83 E.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 596 (plurality opinion) (“[I]ts jurisdiction [is] limited to 
offenses cognizable during time of war . . . .”). 
 84 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1946). 
 85 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 86 See TIMOTHY D. JOHNSON, WINFIELD SCOTT: THE QUEST FOR MILITARY GLORY 165 
(1998); Glazier, supra note 42, at 2027–28. 
 87 JOHNSON, supra note 86, at 165; Glazier, supra note 42, at 2027–28. 
 88 Glazier supra note 42, at 2027–28. 
 89 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 11–12. 
 90 See generally Deborah Pearlstein, Law at the End of War, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/Symposium/ 
SSRN-id2334326.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HL9E-WM7Z.  
 91 See id. at 50–56 (arguing for the adoption of the “cessation of hostilities” standard). 
914 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:5 
 
C. Constraints on Substantive Offenses Under the MCA 
Supreme Court precedent requires that law of war military commission 
charges be grounded in the international law governing armed conflict.92 
Quirin, for example, held that congressional authorization of military 
commission trials is an exercise of authority under the “define and punish” 
clause, which refers specifically to “Offences against the Law of Nations.”93 
That power is thus facially constrained by international law. The Clause’s 
purpose was to permit Congress to provide fair notice by clarifying proscribed 
conduct where there might be ambiguity.94 This does not allow it to depart from 
clear international rules or unilaterally create new offenses, however.95 
Even if Congress could define new offenses, commission jurisdiction would 
still be limited by the fact that the MCA was first enacted in 2006, after most 
detainees now facing prosecution were in U.S. custody and their conduct 
complete. Any new crimes would be ex post facto enactments forbidden by both 
the U.S. Constitution96 and key law of war provisions, including Article 75 of 
the Additional Geneva Protocol I (AP I) of 1977,97 widely acknowledged as 
reflecting customary international law.98 Article 75 says “[n]o one shall be 
accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence under the national or international 
law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed . . . .”99 It is thus 
violated when an individual is charged; conviction is not required. Denial of a 
fair trial is a recognized war crime under both customary and treaty law.100 The 
bar against ex post facto war crime creation was extended to non-international 
armed conflict by Article 6 of the Additional Geneva Protocol II (AP II).101 The 
                                                                                                                       
 92 E.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 596, 641 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942). 
 94 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 315–16, 594–95, 614–
15 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. 1966). 
 95 For a more complete analysis, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a 
Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295, 328–41 
(2010). 
 96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”). 
 97 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 6 § 2(c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
 98 See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 33 (2004) (“This . . . is particularly important as regards 
unlawful combatants who are not entitled to the more favourable treatment of prisoners of 
war. . . .”). 
 99 AP I, supra note 97, art. 75 (emphasis added). 
 100 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 354–72. 
 101 AP II, supra note 97, art. 6.  
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U.S. has not ratified AP II, but has never objected to its provisions, and these 
rules are likely now customary law as well.102 
Congress clearly recognized this concern; the MCA declares: “Because the 
provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been triable 
under the law of war or otherwise triable by military commission, this 
subchapter does not preclude trial for offenses that occurred before the date of 
the enactment . . . .”103 
But congressional statements are insufficient to create legal truth. It is 
incumbent on the commissions to verify their jurisdiction,104 and it is the courts 
that have the final say.105 The D.C. Circuit’s determination that providing 
material support for terrorism and solicitation, which were not previously 
recognized war crimes, could not be applied to conduct taking place before 
MCA enactment106 was thus entirely predictable. 
D. Prosecution of Unprivileged Belligerents 
An important question for the Guantánamo commissions concerns the 
legitimacy of prosecuting “unprivileged belligerency” as a law of war violation. 
All societies criminalize deliberate killing and destruction of property, the very 
acts that governments require their militaries to perform during war.107 To 
“legalize” participation in armed conflict, the law of war must immunize 
soldiers from domestic prosecution; granting what is commonly called the 
“combatant’s privilege.”108 But civilized societies also recognize the need to 
regulate use of force even in war.109 Because combatants’ official acts are 
placed outside ordinary civil jurisdiction, the law of war must fill the resulting 
void, defining limits on the permissible use of force and criminalizing 
violations. 
                                                                                                                       
 102 See, e.g., Customary IHL, Rules 100–02, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul (last visited Aug. 24, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8F43-QKDM. 
 103 10 U.S.C. § 950p(d) (2012). 
 104 The MCA implicitly acknowledges this; 10 U.S.C. § 948d declares in part: “A 
military commission is a competent tribunal to make a finding sufficient for jurisdiction.” 
 105 As John Marshall definitively declared, “It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803). 
 106 See al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324, 2014 WL 3437485, at *21 (D.C. Cir. 
July 14, 2014) (en banc); Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan II), 696 F.3d 1238, 1241 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012), overruled by al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324, 2014 WL 3437485, at *5 
(D.C. Cir. July 14, 2014) (en banc). 
 107 See DINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 31. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See, e.g., UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
§§ 1.16–41 (2004). 
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How does the law treat a force like al Qaeda which generally lacks 
uniforms or regard for the law of war? Criteria for lawful combatantcy are 
formally articulated in The Hague Land Warfare Regulations: 
Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but 
also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:— 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form 
part of it, they are included under the denomination “army.”110 
Because al Qaeda fighters generally lack distinctive emblems/uniforms,111 a 
legally accountable chain of command, and respect for the law of war, they are 
not entitled to claim the “rights” of war, i.e., the combatant’s privilege. The law 
of war need not address unprivileged belligerents’ conduct, however, because 
lacking immunity, they remain fully accountable for any acts of violence they 
commit under regular domestic laws.112 Under some circumstances, they can 
also be prosecuted under the law of war for actual war crimes should their 
conduct bring them within its ambit. German civilians who killed captured 
Allied flyers during World War II were thus prosecuted for war crimes along 
with the German military personnel who encouraged or facilitated those 
killings, for example.113 But, the law of war does not proscribe the routine 
killing of combatants, even by those with no right to participate in hostilities.114 
It was only the fact that the Allied airmen had surrendered which made their 
killing a war crime.115 
When an unprivileged belligerent kills a combatant, Professor Yoram 
Dinstein explains, “[the law of war] refrains from stigmatizing the acts as 
criminal. It merely takes off a mantle of immunity from the defendant, who is 
therefore accessible to penal charges for any offence committed against the 
                                                                                                                       
 110 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annex art. 1, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277–309. This can be read to suggest that members of an “army” need not 
have distinctive emblems, etc., because these criteria are only listed under “militia and 
volunteer corps.” See id. But, scholars agree these are inherent characteristics of an “army” 
and thus did not need explicit mention. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 33–36. 
 111 But see Brian Glyn Williams, The 055 Brigade, WORLD POL. REV. (Oct. 26, 2008), 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/2821/the-055-brigade, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/MT8M-FQMY (reporting that Al Qaeda had a uniformed brigade). 
 112 See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also infra note 305 and accompanying 
text. 
 113 See, e.g., 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS 88–92 (1947). 
 114 DINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 200. 
 115 See 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, supra note 113, at 88–92. 
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domestic legal system.”116 The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) notes that this opinion was the “prevailing view” among participants in 
its expert meetings, and states unequivocally that: 
[C]ivilian direct participation in hostilities is neither prohibited by [the law of 
war] nor criminalized under the statutes of any prior or current international 
criminal tribunal or court. However, because civilians . . . are not entitled to the 
combatant privilege, they do not enjoy immunity from domestic prosecution 
[even] for lawful acts of war. . . . [They] may be prosecuted and punished to 
the extent that their activities, their membership, or the harm caused by them is 
penalized under national law (as treason, arson, murder, etc.).117 
The Supreme Court’s 1942 Quirin decision has confused many subsequent 
commentators by its use of the term “unlawful combatants,” but careful reading 
shows that the saboteurs at issue were privileged belligerents issued uniforms 
by Nazi Germany who unlawfully discarded them in passing behind American 
lines.118 They were thus prosecuted for conduct in violation of the law of war, 
not for their status as unprivileged belligerents. 
Unlike most previous U.S. military commissions, which could also sit as 
military government or martial law courts, the Guantánamo tribunals only have 
law of war jurisdiction. The only legitimate venue for applying U.S. domestic 
law is thus ordinary civilian criminal courts. 
E. Classification of the Conflict  
International law divides armed conflicts into two basic classifications, 
“international” and “non-international.” The full set of law of war rules applies 
only to the former. Historically, nations refused to accept international legal 
regulation of their dealings with rebels or insurgents on their own territory, so 
non-international conflicts fell outside the scope of legal regulation they agreed 
to in dealings with other nation-states.119 This was justifiable given that these 
conflicts were contested within the nation’s own territory where its sovereignty 
was absolute, and against individuals breaching a duty of loyalty by engaging in 
violence against the state.120 States reserved the right to deal with such forces as 
traitors or common criminals.121 The law of war thus made no provision for 
recognizing non-international conflict participants as belligerents or conferring 
                                                                                                                       
 116 DINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 31. 
 117 NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 83–84 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 118 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31, 35–36 (1942). 
 119 See, e.g., EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 32–47 (2008) 
(providing background on the development of law regulating non-international conflict). 
 120 See id. 
 121 See id. 
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protections such as entitlement to prisoner of war (POW) status upon them.122 
The state could rely on its domestic law to legitimize the government’s use of 
force.123 International law also provided no specific authority for detention or 
trial of the opposition forces, again leaving that to the nation’s domestic laws.124 
Nations engaged in non-international conflicts sometimes found it 
advantageous to apply international armed conflict measures such as the right to 
blockade, or to parole or exchange captured fighters under traditional POW 
rules.125 The American Civil War is a classic example. In these cases nations 
could elect to recognize the adversary as a belligerent and draw upon authority 
from the international law of war; they were then also subject to the law’s 
concurrent limitations on the exercise of that authority.126 
The Spanish Civil War led states to recognize the desirability of extending 
some humanitarian protections to non-international conflict participants 
although most still refused to extend the full international law of war rules to 
them.127 Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions128 and Additional 
Geneva Protocol II of 1977129 constitute the international community’s limited 
extension of international regulation to internal conflicts to date. 
The differences between international and non-international conflict are 
particularly evident with respect to war crimes. Historically war crimes were 
defined only for international conflicts; a limited set of offenses is now 
applicable to non-international conflicts.130 The statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), adopted by the United Nations Security 
Council in 1994, was the first binding legal measure establishing individual 
criminal liability for non-international violations.131 The ICTR Statute listed 
only eight specific non-international conflict war crimes (although 
                                                                                                                       
 122 See id. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id.  
 125 See LA HAYE, supra note 119, at 35–37. 
 126 See id. Third states could also recognize a belligerency invoking neutrality law 
provisions which would then allow them to deal even-handedly with both sides. Id. 
 127 See id.  
 128 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva 
IV]. 
 129 AP II, supra note 97, at Part II. 
 130 The U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996, for example, criminalizes numerous violations of 
international armed conflict rules, including all grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and violations of four different Hague Land Warfare Regulations, but only nine 
specific crimes applicable to non-international conflict. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012). 
 131 See LA HAYE, supra note 119, at 1. 
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acknowledging the list was not exclusive).132 Article 8 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) now defines thirty-four war crimes 
applicable in international conflict but only nineteen for non-international.133 
Both the ICC Elements of Crimes, and the jurisprudence of other modern 
international criminal tribunals, require that the classification of the conflict be 
established as an element of proof in order to convict.134 
This element is entirely missing from the Guantánamo prosecutions. 
Neither the MCA,135 nor its predecessor list of crimes, Military Commission 
Instruction No. 2,136 made any effort to associate offenses with conflict 
typology. Moreover, the government itself lacks coherency on the classification 
of the current conflict. 
The U.S. attack on Afghanistan clearly initiated an international conflict, 
and the United States acknowledged the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions even while concluding that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda fighters 
qualified for prisoner of war status.137 The Supreme Court then muddied the 
waters in 2006 by deciding Hamdan v. Rumsfeld on the basis that Common 
Article 3 governing non-international conflict applied, which was sufficient to 
invalidate the Guantánamo trials.138 Following Hamdan, commentators began 
referring to the conflict as non-international and the DOD declared itself 
accountable only for conforming detainee treatment to Common Article 3’s 
limited mandates.139 The Obama Administration apparently recognizes that 
neither non-international conflict rules nor U.S. domestic law provide the 
requisite legal authority for indefinite detention; it contends that “[p]rinciples 
derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed conflicts, 
therefore, must inform the interpretation of the detention authority Congress has 
                                                                                                                       
 132 Comm’n of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 935 (1994), 
Final Rep., transmitted by letter dated Dec. 9, 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, 41–42, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
 133 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 134 See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES art. 8 (2011), available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elements 
ofcrimeseng.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4CUV-FCCC; see also Prosecutor v. 
Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 100–02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008). 
 135 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950(t) (2012). 
 136 See DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2 (2003). 
 137 Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Vice 
President et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/ 
bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S7LQ-23V2 (regarding the 
“[h]umane [t]reatment of Taliban and al Qaeda [d]etainees”). 
 138  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–35 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 139 Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’ys of the 
Military Dep’ts et al. (July 7, 2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/ 
pubs/pdfs/DepSecDef%20memo%20on%20common%20article%203.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/MVE8-CCQS. 
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authorized for the current armed conflict.”140 But, it has only directed that 
Guantánamo “conditions of confinement” comply with Common Article 3.141 
After Obama announced U.S. recognition of AP I Article 75 as customary 
international law, an anonymous Administration source said that it would not be 
applied to al Qaeda, implicitly confirming the government viewed that conflict 
as non-international.142 
But law is a two-way street. If the U.S. government need only comply with 
non-international standards, then its adversary must only do so as well. The 
Guantánamo commissions should thus be estopped from prosecuting any 
offense not clearly established as a war crime in non-international conflict. And, 
in any case, the commissions must incorporate conflict typology into their 
elements of proof to conform with current law of war rules. 
III. CONTEMPORARY FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS 
What standards must a military commission trial meet today to be 
considered “fair”? There were essentially no codified international fair trial 
standards when military commissions were last used following World War II, 
other than the 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention’s requirements that a 
“[s]entence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the same 
courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging 
to the armed forces of the detaining Power”143 and that the “protecting Power” 
representing the prisoner’s nation be notified.144 But, these protections were 
rendered moot by a U.S. interpretation—upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Yamashita and subsequently adopted by other Allied nations—that the 
protections only applied to the trial of post-capture offenses.145 Nevertheless, 
U.S. and Allied military tribunals tried Japanese personnel for denying fair trials 
to both prisoners of war and civilians relying on customary international law 
due to the belief that Geneva Convention rules did not apply to these 
situations.146 
                                                                                                                       
 140 See, e.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention 
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay 
Detainee Litigation, 787 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009). 
 141 Exec. Order No. 13,492, Review And Disposition Of Individuals Detained At The 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base And Closure Of Detention Facilities, 3 C.F.R. 203, § 6 (2010). 
 142 See Julian E. Barnes, Geneva Protections for al Qaeda Suspects? Read the Fine 
Print, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/03/ 
14/geneva-protections-for-al-qaeda-suspects-read-the-fine-print/?mod=google_news_blog, 
archived at http://perma.cc/N2MZ-S9MB. 
 143 Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 63, July 27, 1929, 47 
Stat. 2021. 
 144 See id. arts. 65–66. 
 145 See 15 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
99–100 (1949). 
 146  Id. at 99–100, 113. 
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A. Modern Criminal Procedure Standards 
The international community has endeavored to fill the treaty-coverage gap 
with respect to fair trial standards in the years since World War II. More explicit 
requirements were incorporated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions dealing with 
prisoners of war (Third Convention)147 and civilians (Fourth Convention),148 
while Common Article 3 addresses non-international conflicts in all four 
conventions, requiring that trials be conducted by a “regularly constituted court, 
affording all the judicial guarantees . . . recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”149 The additional Geneva Protocols of 1977 provided more specifics 
in provisions applicable to both international (Article 75 of AP I)150 and non-
international (Article 6 of AP II)151 conflict. The military commissions’ Chief 
Prosecutor, Brigadier General Mark Martins, concedes that both are now 
recognized by the United States as binding customary international law. 152 
Martins has helpfully now provided a list of these “fundamental guarantees of 
fairness and justice,” which he asserts that the Guantánamo commissions meet: 
The accused is presumed innocent. The prosecution must prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused has: the right to notice of the charges; 
the right to counsel and choice of counsel; the right to be present during the 
proceedings; the right against self-incrimination; protection against use of 
statements obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; 
the requirement that admitted statements be voluntary; the right to present 
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and compel attendance of witnesses in his 
defense; the right to exculpatory evidence that the prosecution may have as to 
guilt, sentencing, and the credibility of adverse witnesses; the right to an 
impartial decision-maker; the right to exclusion of evidence that is not reliable 
or probative or that will result in unfair prejudice; the right to qualified self-
representation; protection against double jeopardy and against ex post facto 
laws; and the right to appeal to a federal civilian court consisting of 
independent judges, and ultimately to the United States Supreme Court.153 
Two important observations are in order. First, Parts IV and V of this 
Article will demonstrate commission failings with respect to several of these 
core requirements, including inter alia, denial of right to counsel of choice, use 
                                                                                                                       
 147 See Geneva III, supra note 128, arts. 84, 102, 105–06. 
 148 See Geneva IV, supra note 128, arts. 71–72. 
 149 See Geneva I, supra note 128, art. 3. 
 150 AP I, supra note 97, art. 75. 
 151 AP II, supra note 97, art. 6. 
 152 Mark Martins, Chief Prosecutor, U.S. Military Comm’n, The Use of Military 
Commissions for Trials of Al-Qaeda and Associated Forces, Address at Chatham House 5 
(Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/ 
public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/280912Martins.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
6GGP-NEC5. 
 153 Id. at 6–7. 
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of potentially tainted evidence including statements obtained via coercion, and 
prosecutions based on ex post facto charges. So the commissions do not actually 
measure up to the standards that the prosecution acknowledges that they must. 
Second, these procedural measures are necessary conditions for a fair trial; each 
item in this list is mandated either by current international law, the MCA, or 
both.154 But they are not sufficient. Failure to satisfy personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction, for example, or convictions based on unreliable evidence will 
condemn a trial to failure just as surely as will violation of a formal procedural 
mandate. And the treaty-based rules identified by Martins do not address still 
more recent legal developments such as the requirement enforced by 
contemporary international criminal tribunals for “equality of arms” between 
the prosecution and defense, or the need to distinguish between crimes in 
international and non-international conflicts.155 
B. Requirement for Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
It is a longstanding principle of justice that a court must have valid 
jurisdiction to conduct a trial. The U.S. Supreme Court holds: 
Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which 
occurs in the cause; and, whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its 
judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court. But, if it 
act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They 
are not voidable, but simply void.156 
The international mandate for a law of war tribunal to have subject matter 
jurisdiction is implicit in the ex post facto prohibitions. Article 75 of Additional 
Geneva Protocol I, for example, declares “[n]o one shall be accused or 
convicted of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under the national or international law to which he 
was subject at the time when it was committed . . . .”157 
C. Proof via Credible Evidence 
There is little doubt that modern American civilian courts comply with 
international procedural standards. Yet the growing body of documented 
                                                                                                                       
 154 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 14–15, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); sources 
cited supra notes 6, 97 & 128. 
 155 See infra Part IV. 
 156 In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 220 (1888) (citation omitted). 
 157 AP I, supra note 97, art. 75, § 4(c). 
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erroneous convictions, including 146 exonerations of death row prisoners,158 
whose cases should theoretically have been subject to the highest degree of 
scrutiny at trial, show that judicial credibility requires more than just notional 
compliance with procedural standards. 
Despite concerns with some procedural and substantive aspects, the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal’s trial of senior Nazi leaders has 
fared reasonably well in the historical spotlight.159 The primary reason for this 
was lead prosecutor Robert Jackson’s insistence on using only the most credible 
possible proof of the almost incomprehensible Nazi wrongdoing.160 Jackson 
placed primary reliance on the Germans’ own documentation of their acts—
using official papers, film footage, and still photos.161 Commentators note this 
made for “boring” trial days because the tribunal required documents to be read 
into evidence.162 Greater reliance on live witnesses would have produced more 
interesting court sessions, but Jackson was concerned that many would 
necessarily be persecution victims “hostile to the Nazis, . . . chargeable with 
bias, faulty recollection, and even perjury.”163 And he felt that use of 
accomplice testimony “always gives the conviction a bad odor. We decided that 
it would be better to lose our case against some defendants than to win by a deal 
that would discredit the judgment.”164 It worked. As Jackson noted in his post-
trial report to the President, 
We have documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions, 
persecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that there 
can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future and no tradition of 
martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed people. . . . [T]heir 
fate leaves no incentive to emulation of their example.165 
The Guantánamo commissions, in contrast are placing significant reliance 
on detainee admissions despite well documented U.S. coercive interrogation 
                                                                                                                       
 158 Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last updated Sept. 3, 2014), 
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 159 Seven German organizations were also tried at Nuremberg, with four “convicted.” 
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 160 LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT 16–18 (2001). 
 161 Id. at 12. 
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 163 Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL xxix, 
xxxv (1999). 
 164 Id. at xxxvi. 
 165 Robert H. Jackson, Justice Jackson’s Final Report to the President Concerning the 
Nurnberg War Crimes Trial, 20 TEMP. L.Q. 338, 343 (1947). 
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practices.166 They have even accepted a plea agreement in which a detainee 
tortured by the CIA has promised testimony in exchange for an assured release 
from what might otherwise be lifelong preventive detention.167 
The Nuremberg tribunal sat nearly seventy years ago, before the first 
incorporation of fair trial standards into international human rights law or the 
reformation of U.S. constitutional criminal procedure under the Warren Court. 
Nuremberg nevertheless set a high standard for the Guantánamo trials. Clearing 
that bar is insufficient for the commissions to claim “victory,” they must meet 
twenty-first century judicial standards to merit approbation. But falling short of 
the Nuremberg legacy will be prima facie evidence of failure. 
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES WITH THE GUANTÁNAMO COMMISSIONS 
Commissions conducted under the current MCA represent a substantial 
improvement over the early Bush Administration trial rules. But are they now 
sufficiently fair to withstand judicial scrutiny and merit public respect for their 
verdicts? In a word, no. They remain flawed in terms of both their written rules 
and actual trial practice. In some areas this stems from MCA language 
permitting downward departures from regular federal court or court-martial 
practices. In other areas, the government is failing to apply statutory MCA 
language in good faith, defeating congressional efforts to correct commission 
shortcomings. 
This Part addresses six areas of concern including the lack of equal 
protection, excessive concentration of authority in the hands of a civilian 
convening authority, denial of representation by counsel of choice, inequality 
between prosecution and defense, government abuse of classification rules, and 
the potential admission of evidence obtained by coercion. Several of these 
defects are interrelated, and their combination undermines the commissions’ 
ability to deliver fair trials. 
A. Denial of Equal Protection 
U.S. military justice has been permitted to be more summary than American 
civil courts based on exigencies of military service, not to facilitate convictions 
via substandard justice. Historically, military officers have elected to follow 
higher standards than Congress has mandated, choosing, for example, to adopt 
                                                                                                                       
 166 See, e.g., Andy Worthington, Bin Laden Driver Salim Hamdan Gets Mixed Verdict in 
First Military Commission Trial, ALTERNET (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.alternet.org/ 
story/94133/bin_laden_driver_salim_hamdan_gets_mixed_verdict_in_first_military_commi
ssion_trial, archived at http://perma.cc/8SRF-RV4U. 
 167 See Scott Shane, Testimony on Al Qaeda Is Required in Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/us/majid-khan-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-
plots-in-military-court.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/XA9F-SPCL. 
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common law rules of evidence and allowing defendants assistance of counsel 
even when prosecutions were conducted by lay officers.168 
All previous U.S. military tribunals could try Americans.169 The 
Guantánamo military commissions, applying lower standards of justice only to 
foreign nationals, are thus unprecedented. Even if these treaties are not directly 
applicable to Guantánamo detainees, the fact that this approach violates the 
Third Geneva Convention,170—as well as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights’ mandate that “[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts 
and tribunals,”171—suggests that this disparity will undermine the tribunals’ 
international credibility. And, as Jordan Paust argues, this disparate treatment 
likely violates bilateral treaties with Pakistan and Yemen.172 Based on the 
Boumediene decision finding that the constitutional right to habeas corpus 
extends to Guantánamo and the general holdings of the Insular Cases it cites,173 
federal courts will be called upon to identify the set of “fundamental rights” that 
apply to Guantánamo. Even if federal judges predictably find the full Bill of 
Rights inapplicable, equal protection is arguably such a fundamental right that 
U.S. courts should overturn tribunals trying only foreign nationals. 
B. Multiple Roles and Civilian Status of the Convening Authority 
The MCA bases military commission procedure on “the procedures for trial 
by general courts-martial under . . . the Uniform Code of Military Justice,”174 
although it allows the Secretary of Defense to designate “any officer or official 
of the United States” to convene them.175 To date all military commission 
Convening Authorities have been civilians, including two retired judge 
advocates and one former Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) 
judge.176 The UCMJ, in contrast, restricts convening courts-martial to officers 
                                                                                                                       
 168 Glazier, supra note 42, at 2025–26; Glazier, supra note 35, at 53–54. 
 169 See, e.g., Glazier, supra note 35, at 31–39, 47–56 (documenting military commission 
trials of Americans through World War II).  
 170 Geneva III, supra note 128, art. 102. 
 171 ICCPR, supra note 154, art. 14. 
 172 Jordan J. Paust, Still Unlawful: The Obama Military Commissions, Supreme Court 
Holdings, and Deviant Dicta in the D.C. Circuit, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 367, 381 (2012). 
 173 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756–59 (2008) (discussing Insular Cases’ 
holdings that guarantees of some fundamental constitutional rights apply even in 
“unincorporated” territory where the full Constitution is inapplicable). 
 174 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c) (2012). 
 175 10 U.S.C. § 948h (2012). 
 176 The first convening authority, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, never 
convened any commissions before being replaced by retired Army judge advocate John D. 
Altenburg, Jr. See David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil 
Over the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 156, 158 
(2008). Altenburg was replaced by former CAAF Judge Susan Crawford, id. at 178–79, who 
was superseded by retired Navy Judge Advocate General Bruce MacDonald in 2010. News 
Release, Dep’t of Def., Former Judge Advocate General of the Navy to Oversee Military 
926 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:5 
 
actually in command billets and the only two civilians in the military chain of 
command, the President and Secretary of Defense.177 
The convening authority performs multiple roles in both systems, including 
approving charges, appointing the trial panel (the rough military approximation 
of a jury that decides guilt and punishment), approving plea bargains, and 
performing the initial post-trial review.178 The Office of Military Commissions 
Convening Authority has the additional power of selecting the chief judge, who 
then assigns trial judges from “a pool of certified military judges nominated for 
that purpose” by the service Judge Advocates General.179 Current Chief Judge 
Colonel James Pohl has detailed himself to the ongoing 9/11 proceedings;180 the 
convening authority has thus effectively picked the judge in the highest profile 
case. This is of particular concern given that Pohl is a retired officer recalled to 
active duty to serve on the commissions for one year at a time.181 He can be 
returned to retired status, at a significant pay cut, on fairly short notice.182 This 
is not merely a theoretical concern; several years ago, the first commissions 
judge, Colonel Peter Brownback, was removed in the midst of Guantánamo 
proceedings after making several rulings that displeased the government.183 
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Court-martial judges, in contrast, are detailed by service Judge Advocate 
Generals and convening authorities have no influence over their selection.184 
The convening authority’s multiple roles are problematic even in regular 
military trials. While some commentators erroneously assert that U.S. courts-
martial are the “gold-standard” of military justice,185 they actually fail to meet 
modern international judicial standards. Other Western democracies now reject 
the multiple roles permitted U.S. convening authorities186 and have either 
changed their law to eliminate this concentration of authority or abolished 
separate military justice systems entirely.187 
The convening authority’s multiple functions stem from the courts-martial’s 
traditional role in maintaining military discipline. The founders recognized that 
American independence (and perhaps their own lives) depended upon the Army 
holding together under harsh Revolutionary War conditions. To instill needed 
discipline, John Adams persuaded Congress to adopt the British Articles of War 
essentially verbatim in 1776.188 The Articles recognized courts-martial as 
needed wherever the military was deployed to promptly resolve charges and 
punish offenders.189 Senior field commanders were thus permitted to both 
establish courts-martial and review their judgments.190 Because commanders 
are concurrently responsible for the welfare of their troops, they have a 
countervailing interest in seeing justice done by the defendants. Absent these 
unique considerations, the convening authority’s combination of executive and 
judicial functions should be unacceptable.191 There is no credible justification 
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for the commissions’ concentration of these powers in the hands of a civilian 
outside any chain of command. In reviewing past trials, the Court has 
specifically upheld the authority of “commanders” to convene commissions in 
their “theater of war.”192 But the Guantánamo detainees have been removed 
half-way around the world from the “theater” in which they were captured. 
Courts-martial’s speedy trial rules are inapplicable, so there is no need for quick 
action,193 while actual commission events have revealed the problematic nature 
of these multiple roles, including the close alliance of the convening authority 
with the prosecution.194 
C. Representation by Counsel of Choice 
In its seminal 1932 decision on the right to counsel, Powell v. Alabama, the 
Supreme Court declared: 
The right to be heard would be . . . of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has 
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . Left without the aid of 
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible. . . . [T]hough he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.195 
A logical corollary is that the defendant must trust their counsel for an 
effective defense to be mounted. The Powell Court went on to note that “[i]t is 
hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant 
should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.”196 In 
a 2006 opinion, Justice Scalia held that representation by chosen counsel is such 
a fundamental Sixth Amendment right that “[n]o additional showing of 
prejudice is required to make the violation ‘complete.’”197 
Even though the “law” employed by the Guantánamo commissions is 
“international,” the MCA limits defense counsel to military judge advocates and 
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civilian attorneys who must be U.S. citizens.198 Yet many detainees distrust all 
Americans. Even if the Sixth Amendment is formally inapplicable to 
Guantánamo, the right to counsel of choice is so globally recognized as to 
logically now be a fundamental due process requirement for any criminal trial. 
It was specifically enumerated in the 1919 Versailles Treaty’s provision for 
Allied trials of German war criminals.199 It was accorded to the Nuremberg 
defendants who were each represented by “German counsel of his choice, 
irrespective of whether the lawyer selected had been a member of the Nazi 
Party or might himself be subject to indictment for war crimes.”200 Defendants 
at the International Military Trial for the Far East were allowed primary 
representation by Japanese counsel assisted by a team of American lawyers.201 
And Israel paid $30,000 for Adolph Eichmann to be defended by a German 
attorney of his choice during his 1960 trial.202 
This right is now enshrined in international agreements, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights203 and modern law of war 
treaties, such as the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949;204 the 
governing statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)205 and Rwanda (ICTR);206 and the Rome Statute of the 
ICC.207 
To facilitate choice of counsel, the ICTY and ICTR would waive their 
standing requirements for competence in an official language of the court for 
lawyers speaking the accused’s native language, and even permit representation 
by law professors not admitted to a bar.208 
Choice of counsel has been a major issue at the Guantánamo commissions. 
Several of those tried to date, including both al Bahlul and Khadr, expressed 
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concerns about representation by Americans they did not trust,209 particularly 
uniformed military officers, and pleaded for co-national counsel.210 This 
problem is exacerbated by military rotational assignment practices which result 
in many detainees seeing assigned counsel come and go. Most recently, the 
Army forced Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s long-time military attorney, Major 
Jason Wright, to give up his position as designated military counsel by 
mandating that he either leave the defense team and attend a nine-month 
graduate program or resign his commission.211 Wright chose to resign.212 
Whether always deliberate or not, many policies implemented by the Joint 
Task Force (JTF) responsible for Guantánamo detention operations are highly 
detrimental to effective representation.213 Given the serious inconveniences 
involved with travel to and from Guantánamo, for example, defense attorneys 
realistically need the ability to communicate remotely with their clients between 
court sessions. But, JTF rules forbid telephonic communication,214 and the task 
force commander decreed in 2011 that attorney–client mail would be read, 
rather than merely inspected for contraband.215 As a result, the chief defense 
counsel barred his staff from writing to clients.216 Recent revelations of 
monitoring devices disguised as smoke detectors in rooms used for attorney–
client meetings and the subjection of detainees to intrusive groin searches 
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before meetings with counsel have further impeded attorney–client 
interactions.217 
The MCA requirements for civilian defense counsel are more stringent than 
those set for courts-martial.218 Yet, commission rules are sui generis with 
charges supposedly sourced in international law; no national lawyer brings 
wholly relevant experience to the commissions. Nevertheless, a civilian may 
represent a Guantánamo defendant only if he or she: 
(A) is a United States citizen; 
(B) is admitted to the practice of law in a State, district, or possession of 
the United States, or before a Federal court; 
(C) has not been the subject of any sanction of disciplinary action by any 
court, bar, or other competent governmental authority for relevant 
misconduct;  
(D) has been determined to be eligible for access to information classified 
at the level Secret or higher; and 
(E) has signed a written agreement to comply with all applicable 
regulations or instructions for counsel, including any rules of court for 
conduct during the proceedings.219 
A civilian can represent a court-martial defendant, in contrast, without 
being a U.S. citizen or even a member of any U.S. bar if she just has 
“appropriate training and familiarity with the general principles of criminal law 
which apply in a court-martial.”220 The amplifying Manual for Courts-Martial 
lists factors military judges should consider when authorizing foreign 
representation, including: 
(i) the availability of the counsel at times at which sessions of the court-
martial have been scheduled; 
(ii) whether the accused wants the counsel to appear with military defense   
counsel; 
(iii) the familiarity of the counsel with spoken English; 
                                                                                                                       
 217 See, e.g., Jeff Kaye, Will Bogdan’s Claims of Insufficient Staffing Cause Al Qaeda to 
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(iv) practical alternatives for discipline of the counsel in the event of 
misconduct; 
(v) whether foreign witnesses are expected to testify with whom the 
counsel may more readily communicate than might military counsel; 
and 
(vi) whether ethnic or other similarity between the accused and the counsel 
may facilitate communication and confidence between the accused 
and civilian defense counsel.221 
This last criterion is exactly why representation by foreign counsel is so 
strongly desired by Guantánamo detainees and should be accorded if trials are 
to be credible. Any legitimate concerns about defense lawyers needing to access 
classified information could be addressed by requiring that an appropriately 
cleared U.S. attorney remain part of each defense team as was done at Tokyo; it 
does not require denying a detainee the right to select his primary counsel. 
The MCA mirrors the UCMJ in allowing defendants to request specific 
U.S. military counsel if “reasonably available.”222 But, this statutory 
authorization has been effectively gutted by the DOD; its Manual for Military 
Commissions says that an officer is “reasonably available” for such assignment 
only if already “assigned to the Office of Military Commissions to perform 
defense counsel duties at the time the request is received.”223 The comparatively 
small pool of attorneys assigned to the defense office, coupled with the real 
potential for conflicts arising from an attorney representing more than one 
detainee, renders the statutory language effectively meaningless. Khadr 
previously requested, and was granted, representation by Marine Lieutenant 
Colonel Colby Vokey, then a senior West Coast-based Marine Corps defense 
counsel.224 This would not be permissible under current DOD rules. 
Self-representation has also been a recurring Guantánamo issue, but would 
be far less significant if defendants could choose their own counsel. The right of 
self-representation is widely recognized in international law and explicitly 
authorized by the MCA subject only to requirements that a defendant 
“knowingly and competently waives the assistance of counsel”225 and maintains 
proper courtroom decorum.226 Despite the plain MCA language, no 
Guantánamo detainee has been allowed to represent himself at an actual trial 
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session, providing another reason for concern about the tribunals’ commitment 
to following applicable law.227 
D. Inequality Between Defense and Prosecution 
Prosecutors routinely enjoy overall resource advantage vis-à-vis the 
defendants in most trials. Not surprisingly, Guantánamo practice features 
combined defense teams substantially outnumbered and with less resources than 
the prosecution. Of more concern is the inequality of the two sides before the 
commission. Contemporary international criminal tribunals address this issue 
under the rubric “equality of arms,” requiring that the court ensure equivalent 
treatment with respect to matters within its control.228 
This basic concept finds some support in U.S. courts-martial; the UCMJ 
provides, for example, that defense counsel “shall have equal opportunity to 
obtain witnesses and other evidence.”229 But unlike the UCMJ, the MCA grants 
defendants only “a reasonable opportunity” in this regard,230 although directing 
that “[t]he opportunity to obtain witnesses and evidence shall be comparable to 
the opportunity available to a criminal defendant in a court of the United States 
under Article III of the Constitution.”231 
Commission motions practice reveals prosecution efforts to obstruct 
defense access to witnesses and evidence on a regular basis. The MCA imposes 
an affirmative duty to disclose any exculpatory or mitigating evidence “that is 
known or reasonably should be known to any government officials who 
participated in the investigation and prosecution of the case against the 
defendant.”232 Nevertheless, defense attorneys have had to file repetitive 
motions to compel discovery, which are frequently opposed, and the 
government has imposed obstacles to defense access to materials that judges 
have granted.233 A particular concern is the fact that the defense is dependent on 
the government to identify witnesses to detainee interrogations, but the 
prosecution has zealously fought such discovery requests and also sought to 
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deny defense access to individuals in government custody.234 When frustrated 
detainee lawyers took measures to identify interrogators, a federal investigation 
was launched with the implied threat of criminal prosecution.235 This open 
obstructionism is further exacerbated by ethical breaches reported by insiders 
like former prosecutor Lieutenant Colonel Darrell Vandeveld, who revealed 
government concealment of exculpatory evidence.236 
Access to expert witnesses is another area of dramatic imbalance 
contravening the MCA’s call for equity. The defense lacks independent funding 
for experts and must make case-by-case requests to the convening authority, 
which is closely aligned with the prosecution and routinely denies most 
requests.237 The defense can then petition the military judge to direct the 
provision of an expert, but the prosecution routinely opposes those motions.238 
This violates the MCA mandate for defense witness access equivalent to federal 
court. Federal public defenders have an independent budget for expert 
assistance while appointed counsel are statutorily entitled to ex parte 
consideration of expert witness funding requests.239 
In contrast to these constraints on the defense, the government has spent 
extravagantly on experts. It employed forensic psychiatrist Michael Welner at a 
cost likely over $200,000 to deliver problematic testimony at Khadr’s 
sentencing hearing.240 Welner’s “expertise” was so unimpressive that the judge 
reportedly quipped that “Dr. Welner would have been as likely to be accurate if 
he used an Ouija board.”241 And the government can spend $2,250 per day plus 
expenses for Evan Kohlmann to testify for the admission of his inflammatory 
pseudo-documentary The Al Qaeda Plan that Kohlmann assembled from the 
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internet videos even though it lacks relevance to most cases.242 One Hamdan 
trial observer reported: 
The defense objected to having the video shown because it did not 
show . . . or even suggest that Hamdan was involved in or had any knowledge 
of the attacks depicted, and because its images of the destruction of the Twin 
Towers would unduly prejudice the military commission’s panel of military 
officers who will determine Hamdan’s fate. Every government witness to take 
the stand in this trial has testified that there is no evidence that Hamdan had 
any role in the planning or execution of any terrorist attack, including 
9/11. . . . Judge Keith Allred nevertheless overruled defense objections to the 
movie. 243 
But while Kohlmann was flown to Guantánamo and paid to support the 
admission of this problematic video, law of war expert Geoffrey Corn had to 
deliver core testimony for Hamdan’s defense via VTC on a pro bono basis after 
the convening authority refused government funding.244 This evident disparity 
not only violates international legal standards, it now contravenes explicit 
congressional intent. Language in the 2010 DOD authorization bill proclaims: 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the fairness and effectiveness of the military commissions 
system . . . will depend to a significant degree on the adequacy of 
defense counsel and associated resources for individuals accused, 
particularly in the case of capital cases, . . . and 
(2) defense counsel in military commission cases, particularly in 
capital cases . . . should be fully resourced as provided in such 
chapter 47A.245 
This inequality is further highlighted by a disparity in military ranks. The 
prosecution team is headed administratively and in the courtroom by Brigadier 
General Mark Martins (an O-7).246 The defense office is administratively 
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headed by a colonel (O-6),247 but no defendant has a courtroom lawyer higher 
than O-5; the most significant detainee, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, was only 
assigned a major (O-4).248 This results in the prosecutor outranking both every 
member of the defense and the judge, and translates into practical advantages 
such as invitations to champion the military commission system and the 
prosecution’s cause in extrajudicial appearances before influential public 
audiences.249 In January 2014, defense counsel for alleged 9/11 conspirator bin 
Attash called these public comments (and difficulties in obtaining discovery) to 
the judge’s attention and sought a protective order requiring the prosecution to 
limit public comments to factual and schedule matters.250 
While the DOD seems tone deaf to these concerns, Congress, to its credit, is 
not entirely so. The 2014 National Defense Authorization Act included a 
waivable mandate for the DOD to fill the chief defense counsel and prosecutor 
billets with officers of the same grade and calls for equitable resources between 
the two sides.251 But because the chief defense counsel’s role is administrative, 
overseeing teams of attorneys with potentially serious conflicts of interest, this 
would not actually alter the rank inequality within the courtroom even if the 
DOD elected to comply. Apparently, however, it will not. The government 
reportedly issued itself a waiver in February 2014.252 
E. Abuse of Classification Authority 
Because the MCA rules for classified evidence are based on the CIPA, 
which is applicable to regular federal trials,253 the commissions enjoy no 
legitimate advantage over Article III courts in this respect. The commissions’ 
purported information security advantages are thus largely a red herring.254 
                                                                                                                       
 247 Alba Morales, Guantanamo: System Failure, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/ 
msnbc/guantanamo-system-failure (last updated Oct. 3, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
D44G-WQDV. 
 248 See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss Because the Military Commissions Act 
Unconstitutionally Requires the Convening Authority to Act as Both Prosecutor and Judge 
of the Defendants at 13, United States v. Mohammad, AE091 (Military Comm’ns Trial 
Judiciary Oct. 12, 2012). 
 249 See, e.g., Martins, supra note 152, at 6–7. 
 250 Defense Motion for Order to Protect the Right to a Fair Trial, United States v. 
Mohammad at 21–22, AE266(WBA) (Military Comm’ns Trial Judiciary Jan. 22, 2014).  
 251 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, 
§ 1037, 127 Stat. 672, 679 (2013). 
 252 Wells Bennett, 2/19 Motions Session #2: Lawyer Stuff, LAWFARE (Feb. 19, 2014, 
10:58 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/219-motions-session-2-lawyer-stuff/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/87YV-2RG9. 
 253 Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. (2012).  
 254 See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, ‘Urban Myth’ Behind Graham’s Support for 9/11 
Military Trials, WASH. INDEP. (Mar. 11, 2010, 6:00 AM), http:// 
washingtonindependent.com/78925/urban-myth-behind-grahams-support-for-911-military-
trials, archived at http://perma.cc/T6YN-74YS. 
2014] MILITARY COMMISSIONS’ EPIC FAIL 937 
 
The government initially insisted on making anything former CIA detainees 
said presumptively classified information.255 This rendered it almost impossible 
to mount a defense; if a detainee identified a potential alibi witness, for 
example, that information could not be revealed to any uncleared person unless 
reviewed by government security personnel and determined to be 
unclassified.256 An attorney could not even use information a defendant might 
provide to them during a trial session without prior classification review or 
thirty days advance notice to the court.257 
In December 2013, Judge Pohl issued a less restrictive protective order; 
detainee statements are now only treated as classified if they reveal: 
(a) details of how they were captured; 
(b) the foreign countries in which they were detained; 
(c) the identity or description of anyone involved with their capture, 
detention, or interrogation; 
(d) interrogation techniques to which they were subjected; or 
(e) conditions of their detention in CIA custody.258 
A core trial issue is going to be the admissibility of detainee statements, 
including whether or not detainee admissions to “clean teams” following the 
termination of coercive interrogations are admissible.259 Treating information 
about a detainee’s own interrogations contained in government documents as 
classified bars defense attorneys from discussing it with the detainee and 
requires its handling in secure facilities and transmission only on encrypted 
systems.260 Even the modified protective order is thus still a huge impediment 
to defense efforts. 
The actual courtroom conduct of high-value detainee military commission 
trials has been problematic. Unlike federal courtrooms, spectators and media at 
the commissions “are sequestered in a soundproofed room behind thick glass” 
and thus wholly dependent upon a speaker system with a forty-second delay to 
hear what is being said. 261 A “court security officer” has control over the audio 
feed for the primary purpose of keeping the public from hearing about the 
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defendants’ treatment in CIA hands.262 The government effectively admits this. 
In its motion requesting the initial protective order for the alleged 9/11 co-
conspirators, the prosecution declared that: 
The accused are all former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) detainees 
who were transferred from CIA custody to the custody of the Department of 
Defense (DOD) at U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). The 
accused were exposed to classified intelligence sources and methods while 
they were in CIA custody, and thus are in a position to be able to publicly 
reveal this highly classified information through their own statements. Any 
public disclosure of this TOP SECRET (SCI) information at the upcoming 
arraignment or during any other proceedings in this case reasonably could be 
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.263 
The SCI classification assigned to detainee comments and concerns for 
protecting “sources and methods” of intelligence collection is unjustifiable. 
National security doctrine recognizes that disclosure of specific information 
known about an adversary can be harmful to national security, but details about 
U.S. intelligence capabilities are even more sensitive because they can be used 
to deny future collection.264 But this is not a valid concern with respect to the 
Guantánamo detainees. The coercive interrogation procedures they were 
subjected to during the Bush Administration have been repudiated by the 
Department of Justice, which has withdrawn the legal memos approving 
them.265 More importantly, they have been banned by President Obama; an 
executive order now limits any U.S. government interrogations to those 
permitted by the Army’s intelligence collection field manual.266 It therefore 
cannot be necessary to classify this information to protect “intelligence sources 
and methods” from disclosure to potential adversaries today, leading to the 
obvious conclusion that the purpose of maintaining this secrecy is to protect the 
CIA from accountability for past detainee abuse. This is not a legitimate judicial 
function—it is obstruction of justice. President Obama’s own executive order 
categorically bars classification intended to “conceal violations of law” or 
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“prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency.”267 If this is the 
“security” rationale being used to justify continued employment of military 
commissions, it wholly undermines their legitimacy. 
F. Admission of Evidence Obtained Through Torture or Coercion 
Government efforts to get statements tainted by coercion admitted into 
evidence also violate the law and call into question the commissions’ 
commitment to justice. The 2009 MCA is unmistakably clear: 
No statement obtained by the use of torture or by cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment (as defined by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
(42 U.S.C. 2000dd)), whether or not under color of law, shall be admissible in 
a military commission under this chapter, except against a person accused of 
torture or such treatment as evidence that the statement was made.268 
Other MCA language sets an even higher standard for the admission of a 
defendant’s own words. With a narrow exception for statements at the actual 
point of capture or during “related active combat engagement,” it requires that 
any statement made by an accused must have been “voluntarily given” to be 
admissible.269 
Despite these clear rules, commission prosecutors have rationalized that it is 
the judge’s responsibility, not theirs, to act as the admissibility gatekeeper.270 
Successful efforts to get Khadr’s statements admitted in the summer of 2010 
show that this effort continued even under the Obama Administration.271 This 
might be justified if commission judges were in a position to objectively weigh 
the relevant factors necessary to determine a statement’s pedigree, but they are 
not. In an adversarial system, the judge must rely on the parties to present the 
information necessary to reach their decisions. But the government holds all the 
cards with respect to how these detainee statements were obtained. Through 
control of the classification system, restrictions on the identification of, and 
access to, potential witnesses, and limitations on what discovery is provided, it 
effectively restricts the defense’s access to the information needed to credibly 
challenge the admission of statements obtained through coercion. “Letting the 
judge decide” is thus tantamount to allowing coerced statements to be used in 
contravention of the clear statutory prohibitions against doing so. 
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For this reason, the commissions’ ability to admit hearsay evidence is now a 
matter of critical concern. The initial outcry about hearsay admission following 
President Bush’s initial decision to employ the commissions272 was largely an 
instinctive reaction on the part of those schooled in the Anglo-American legal 
tradition. Hearsay use is not inherently detrimental to the defense. In military 
commissions conducted in Guam following World War II, for example, half the 
requests for relaxations to the rules of evidence came from the defense.273 It is 
easy to imagine a Guantánamo defendant with alibi or character witnesses who 
would be afraid to travel there for fear of ending up detained themselves. And 
two witnesses Hamdan wanted to call were barred by the government because 
they were on the “no-fly” list.274 
The most plausible reason initially advanced to justify hearsay admission 
was the need to avoid disruption of U.S. military activities.275 It was assumed 
that American soldiers were involved with most detainees’ capture and initial 
questioning but that requiring these personnel be available to testify could 
adversely impact military operations.276 Reliance upon post-capture reports or 
affidavits would thus offer real practical advantage. Today, however, we know 
that military personnel were involved with perhaps five percent of the 
Guantánamo captures,277 and that abusive interrogation practices require careful 
inquiry into the provenance of any statements either sought to be admitted 
directly or which led to other evidence collection. 
The MCA restricts hearsay use, requiring advance notice and “fair 
opportunity to meet the evidence.”278 The judge must assess “indicia of 
reliability within the statement” and “whether the will of the declarant was 
overborne.”279 This latter consideration will be difficult to establish without 
access to the declarant. From a practical perspective, the rules burden the 
defense to demonstrate why hearsay should be kept out while the government 
controls the information necessary to do so. 
Advances in video-teleconferencing, including do-it-yourself capabilities 
like Skype, largely obviate the need to deny live cross-examination even when 
it is not practicable to get witnesses to Guantánamo. The commissions have 
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already used video-teleconferencing multiple times to facilitate testimony, 
including that of a defense expert whose travel the government would not 
underwrite280 and the testimony of an officer in Afghanistan.281 This latter 
appearance demonstrates the fallacy of concluding that even soldiers in forward 
theaters are unavailable to testify at Guantánamo. If the commissions are to be 
credible, hearsay use must not be allowed whenever it could include 
information gleaned from interrogations of detainees who cannot be questioned 
about the surrounding circumstances. This should include not just detainee 
statements per se, but also interrogators’ reports. 
Evidence obtained through coercion must be barred from the Guantánamo 
commissions because the law requires it.282 But there is an important practical 
reason for this too–it is unreliable. Its use will result in false convictions and 
thoroughly discredit the trials. Public discussions of “ticking bomb” scenarios 
and “torture warrants” create the impression that coercive interrogations 
produce accurate information,283 but this is largely incorrect. The “enhanced” 
techniques applied at Guantánamo and black sites were derived from the CIA’s 
KUBARK manual284 and those techniques U.S. military personnel are exposed 
to during Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training.285 These 
techniques were developed by the Soviets, Chinese, North Koreans, and North 
Vietnamese for the purpose of eliciting false confessions for show trials and 
propaganda purposes, not for truth-seeking.286 Militaries on both sides during 
World War II, in contrast, recognized the importance of rapport-building 
techniques, not coercion, to gain accurate information, a conclusion shared by 
professional interrogators today.287 It thus defies logic that justice could be done 
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using information obtained via coercive means. Military commission use of 
information developed through these techniques would render their verdicts as 
unworthy of respect as those of Stalin’s show trials. 
A particularly insidious aspect of the government’s coercive interrogation 
techniques is that they were intended to create a lasting sense of “learned 
helplessness” rather than simply yield information while being actively 
applied.288 This necessarily gives reason to doubt whether detainee admissions 
obtained by separate “clean teams” after extended “enhanced interrogations” 
ended can meet the MCA’s voluntariness standards, and requires that the 
defense be able to fully investigate the treatment their clients were subjected to 
throughout their captivity.289 
V. AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY COMMISSION CHARGES AS LEVIED 
This part examines the charges against three Obama-era defendants—
Khadr, al Nashiri, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad—to highlight the variety of 
legal issues posed by the questionable application of substantive law in the 
Guantánamo commissions. Khadr’s five charges represent every offense 
involved in the first seven completed Guantánamo prosecutions; if his 
“conviction” lacks legal merit, then each of these others does as well. Al Nashiri 
is currently facing charges relating most prominently to the bombing of the USS 
Cole in Aden, Yemen, in 2000, as well as the 2002 attack on the French tanker 
MV Limburg. This would be a straightforward terrorism case in a federal court 
(which can unquestionably exercise jurisdiction over these events), but it raises 
serious issues about the timing and scope of armed conflict which call into 
question its validity as a law of war prosecution. If the Limburg is outside the 
scope of the current U.S. conflict, then the eighth and final completed 
prosecution to date, that of al Darbi,290 fails as well. Finally, the case of Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammad and his alleged co-conspirators shows that even while some 
al Qaeda members may be legitimately charged under the law of war for at least 
some of their conduct, doing so unnecessarily raises issues entirely avoidable in 
federal court, which complicates and prolongs efforts to see justice done. 
A. Omar Khadr 
Youthful Canadian citizen Omar Khadr was the most controversial 
Guantánamo defendant “convicted” to date, and his October 2010 guilty plea 
failed to resolve underlying concerns. The scion of a radical Muslim family 
receiving little sympathy within his own country,291 Khadr pleaded guilty to 
                                                                                                                       
 288 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S TASK 
FORCE ON DETAINEE TREATMENT 205–06 (2013). 
 289 See 10 U.S.C. § 948r(d) (2012). 
 290 See Offer for Pretrial Agreement at 8, United States v. al Darbi, AE010 (Military 
Comm’ns Trial Judiciary Dec. 20, 2013); Savage, supra note 78. 
 291 SHEPHARD, supra note 224, at ix–xiv. 
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charges alleging that he received al Qaeda weapons training after 9/11, spied on 
U.S. forces, helped make and plant improvised explosive devices, and killed a 
U.S. soldier with a hand grenade.292 Serious questions were raised prior to his 
plea about the accuracy of the underlying facts,293 about admissions extracted 
through threats and physical abuse,294 and about the legitimacy of prosecuting 
war crimes committed at age fifteen.295 Far less attention was given to whether 
his charges described law of war violations triable by a military commission. 
The analysis that follows concludes that none of Khadr’s five charges described 
actual war crimes296 even assuming the underlying factual predicates are true. 
The commission thus lacked subject matter jurisdiction.297 If the United States 
wanted to prosecute him, it should have done so in domestic U.S. or Afghan 
criminal courts. 
Khadr faced five separate charges:  
(1) murder in violation of the law of war 
(2) attempted murder in violation of the law of war 
(3) conspiracy 
(4) providing material support for terrorism 
(5) spying298 
1. Murder in Violation of the Law of War 
Murder in violation of the law of war was the most serious charge levied 
against Khadr. The specification stated that “while in the context of and 
associated with hostilities and without enjoying combatant immunity, [he] 
unlawfully and intentionally murder[ed] U.S. Army Sergeant First Class 
Christopher Speer . . . by throwing a hand grenade at U.S. forces . . . .”299 
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International law clearly proscribes conduct fairly described as “murder in 
violation of the law of war.”300 The issue is with its application to Khadr. The 
relevant MCA language reads: 
(15) MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR.—Any person 
subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons, including 
privileged belligerents, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by 
death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter 
may direct.301 
Assuming arguendo Khadr killed a U.S. soldier in combat, it would not 
violate the law of war,302 thus falling outside the scope of this offense. Because 
combatants are “fair game,” the law of war must identify and protect those 
individuals not liable to direct attack.303 Under the rubric of “willful killing,” 
the Geneva Conventions proscribe deliberate targeting of “protected 
persons,”304 i.e., individuals who either have never been, or no longer are, 
participants in hostilities. The former category includes civilians (other than 
those directly participating in hostilities),305 and “non-combatants”306—
members of an armed force assigned to medical, religious, or civil defense 
duties, and barred from fighting except in self-defense. The latter category 
includes combatants placed hors de combat due to illness, wounds, or 
shipwreck; having voluntarily offered surrender; or forced to bail out of 
damaged aircraft.307 Deliberately killing any of these individuals would be “in 
violation of the law of war.”308 These rules are recognized as customary law, so 
this outcome is not dependent upon the Geneva Conventions applying.309 
Killing privileged belligerents310 can be a war crime if proscriptions against 
impermissible means and methods of warfare are violated.311 These situations 
fall into two general categories: use of a prohibited weapon or means, such as 
poison;312 or killing facilitated by treachery or “perfidy.”313 The law of war can 
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ban weapons either by specific agreement or because they violate general 
principles addressing “distinction,” “superfluous injury,” and “unnecessary 
suffering.”314 Attacks involving treachery or perfidy are essentially hostile acts 
facilitated by falsely inducing the enemy to believe that the attacker is entitled 
to a protected status, such as misuse of a flag of truce or protective emblems 
like the red cross.315 The 1873 military commission trial of six Modoc Indians 
for killing under a flag of truce exemplifies the valid use of this charge.316 The 
Philippine Insurrection of 1899–1902 provides more relevant examples.317 
Some of those cases referred to the perpetrators as “guerillas” or “outlaws,”318 
but in each case where factual details are available, it was the actual conduct 
involved, not the status of the perpetrators, which rendered the offense “in 
violation of the law of war.”319 Acts charged under this nomenclature included 
burying a wounded U.S. sailor alive,320 killing prisoners,321 and the use of 
assassins behind the lines.322 When an otherwise lawful combatant commits one 
of these violations, they are subject to trial under the law of war—that is, they 
can be prosecuted for a “war crime.”323 The problem in Khadr’s case was the 
overbroad application of the charge, endeavoring to make any killing by an 
unprivileged belligerent fall within its definition. This approach repudiates the 
functional equivalence between the conflict parties which is a core element of 
the law of war and endeavors to transform it into a unilateral shield for one side. 
This stretch is traceable to the Manual for Military Commissions, providing 
DOD guidance supplementing the MCA.324 The Manual specifies required 
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elements of proof for each MCA offense. It establishes the elements for murder 
in violation of the law of war as: 
(1) One or more persons are dead; 
(2) The death of the persons resulted from the act or omission of the 
accused; 
(3) The killing was unlawful; 
(4) The accused intended to kill the person or persons; 
(5) The killing was in violation of the law of war; and 
(6) The killing took place in the context of and was associated with an 
hostilities.325 
There are no fatal flaws in this formulation, which still limits the crime to 
acts violating the law of war. But the comment following these elements states 
that an accused “may be convicted in a military commission for these offenses 
if . . . [the accused] engaged in conduct traditionally triable by military 
commission (e.g., spying; murder committed while the accused did not meet the 
requirements of privileged belligerency) even if such conduct does not violate 
the international law of war.”326 
It is not clear that Congress has the constitutional authority to make murder 
committed while the accused did not meet the requirements of privileged 
belligerency—a matter the law of war leaves to domestic law—triable by 
military commission outside occupied territory where a commission can have 
“domestic” law authority.327 But that is not the issue here because Congress 
explicitly limited the MCA’s application to killings which violate the law of 
war.328 The Manual’s drafters seemingly recognized this when they correctly 
incorporated that requirement into the elements of the offense; the subsequent 
departure in the comment is thus wholly inexplicable.329 The Secretary of 
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Defense is logically entitled to “Chevron deference” in interpreting ambiguities 
in the MCA, but cannot depart from clear facial statutory language.330 
The conclusion that Khadr could not validly be prosecuted for “murder in 
violation of the law of war” would not bar him from being held criminally 
accountable if he threw the grenade that killed Sergeant Speer. Lacking 
belligerent immunity, he could have been tried in U.S. district court for 
violating any applicable federal statute having the extraterritorial application 
necessary to reach conduct in Afghanistan. Alternatively, he could have been 
prosecuted under Afghanistan’s domestic laws. 
While fatal to Khadr’s prosecution on this charge, this outcome better 
serves larger U.S. interests. If participation in hostilities by civilians or anyone 
lacking uniforms constituted a war crime, then all those participating in, 
supervising, or having authorized the CIA’s drone program would be war 
criminals, including both Presidents Bush and Obama.331 This criminalization 
would also extend to the use of CIA paramilitary personnel and potentially to 
U.S. support for third country “unprivileged belligerents,” such as the Afghan 
mujahidin who opposed the Soviet invasion. Ironically, testimony at Khadr’s 
trial revealed that a CIA officer in civilian clothes—an unprivileged 
belligerent—was present at the fatal firefight.332 
International criminal law does not formally recognize the defense of tu 
quoque.333 But the Allies refrained from prosecuting the Luftwaffe’s conduct 
during the Blitz on London at Nuremberg in light of their own subsequent aerial 
decimation of German cities, and the judges declined to punish Admiral Karl 
Dönitz for conducting unrestricted submarine warfare after the introduction of 
an interrogatory showing that the U.S. Navy had done the same thing against 
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Japan.334 The hypocrisy of prosecuting a defendant for conduct that the U.S. 
government’s personnel engaged in during the very incident from which the 
charges are based undermines the commissions’ credibility. 
2. Attempted Murder in Violation of the Law of War 
Khadr’s second charge was attempted murder in violation of the law of war, 
alleging that he endeavored to kill coalition personnel “by converting land 
mines into improvised explosive devices and planting [them] in the ground.”335 
This charge is based on MCA language: 
(28) ATTEMPTS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Any person subject to this chapter who attempts 
to commit any offense punishable by this chapter shall be punished as a 
military commission under this chapter may direct. 
(B) SCOPE OF OFFENSE.—An act, done with specific intent to 
commit an offense under this chapter, amounting to more than mere 
preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is 
an attempt to commit that offense.336 
This definition seems reasonable; international criminal law recognizes 
inchoate attempt liability once a “substantial step” towards completion has been 
taken.337 But because each attempt specification must incorporate another MCA 
offense, it is subject to any issues associated with that charge. Khadr’s attempt 
count suffers the same problem as his murder charge—although the offense is 
capable of valid application, the specific conduct alleged in the specification 
fails to state a law of war violation. 
Legal rules governing the use of mines and booby traps have evolved 
substantially over the last several decades.338 The driving force has been 
growing awareness of the harms these weapons wreak on civilians, often long 
after the conflict has ended. The focus of these developments has thus been on 
restricting the weapons most likely to inflict civilian casualties, including 
particularly anti-personnel mines readily detonated by unintended victims.339 
But there is no general prohibition against anti-vehicle mines, and nothing 
inherently unlawful about the use of improvised explosive devices. The act 
Khadr is accused of, taking mines which would indiscriminately detonate under 
any heavy passing vehicle, military or civilian, and converting them into 
devices selectively detonated to target opposing military forces, should actually 
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be favored under the law of war, even if uniquely detrimental to coalition 
forces. 
The gravamen of this charge as applied is thus not that Khadr’s conduct 
violated the law of war, a necessary element for conviction under the statutory 
language, but rather his status as an unprivileged belligerent. While this status 
would support prosecution under ordinary domestic laws from which he lacks 
immunity, it does not support a law of war prosecution.340 
3. Conspiracy 
The third charge levied against Khadr, conspiracy, is problematic as a law 
of war violation in any context.341 International law is necessarily developed by 
the entire international community, but the substantive offense of conspiracy 
derives from English common law.342 World War II U.S. tribunals explicitly 
rejected the notion that conspiracy to commit a war crime constituted a stand-
alone offense.343 A Supreme Court plurality discussed the charge’s specific 
flaws in Hamdan, noting inter alia that a conspiracy spanning 1996–2001 
predated the conflict with al Qaeda, and that none of Hamdan’s alleged conduct 
violated the law of war. 344 
These issues are more pronounced with respect to Khadr, who only 
associated with al Qaeda during a two month span in mid-2002, well after all 
acts attributed to the conspiracy in his charges—including the 1998 embassy 
bombings and 9/11—were completed.345 Nothing alleged in his personal 
conduct constituted criminal law of war violations. The conspiracy charge thus 
distilled down to Khadr having fought on the wrong side. But the law of war is 
grounded on legal equality. The cause one fights for makes no difference; those 
on both sides have equal rights and obligations.346 Logic demands this. If just 
fighting for the wrong side was already a crime, it would remove any incentive 
for those personnel to comply with law of war rules, ensuring the conflict’s 
rapid descent into barbarity. Khadr’s conspiracy charge is the logical equivalent 
of trying to hold every German soldier liable for the Nazi leadership’s sins. 
The government ultimately recognized the flaws in its position. But rather 
than concede the charge’s invalidity, it asserted that the Guantánamo 
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commissions could prosecute conspiracy as a violation of domestic, rather than 
international law, despite their dependence on the law of war as the basic source 
of their jurisdiction.347 The D.C. Circuit addressed this issue rather curiously in 
its en banc July 2014 al Bahlul decision, holding that al Bahlul waived 
objection to the charge in declining to mount a defense.348 The court thus 
applied only “plain error” review—a standard exceptionally deferential to the 
government—rather than the traditional de novo review granted to questions of 
law.349 The court rejected government efforts to rely on obscure field trials as a 
source of legal authority. But it decided that because conspiracy was a crime 
under ordinary federal criminal law and two prominent historical commission 
trials—those of the Lincoln assassination conspirators in 1865 and eight Nazi 
saboteurs in 1942—had charged conspiracy, it was not “plain error” to allow al 
Bahlul to be charged with this offense.350 The en banc panel then remanded four 
additional constitutional questions, including the argument that including 
conspiracy as an offense exceeded congressional authority under the Define and 
Punish Clause, to a three judge panel for a full hearing.351 This outcome means 
that al Bahlul will wait perhaps another year for a resolution of his case, but 
even more significantly, if his conviction stands, the validity of conspiracy as a 
military commission charge may be substantially re-litigated by a future 
defendant who preserves the issue at trial. 
A further conspiracy issue was injected into the commissions process by the 
charges referred against Abd al Hadi al-Iraqi in June 2014. Al-Iraqi is charged, 
inter alia, with participating in al Qaeda spanning the time period from 1996 
through October 29, 2006.352 Because the initial MCA, which included 
conspiracy as an offense, was signed by President Bush on October 17 of that 
year, the government will predictably argue that there is no ex post facto issue 
with this charge even though the most significant portion of the alleged 
conspiracy took place well prior to that date. 
4. Providing Material Support for Terrorism 
The fourth charge against Khadr, providing material support for terrorism, 
shares similar issues with conspiracy—it both lacks recognized grounding in 
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international law,353 and his charge sheet failed to describe any activity violating 
the law of war. Essentially, the MCA took a federal criminal statute with a 
proven track record354 and sought to make it triable by the commissions. It was 
reenacted in the 2009 MCA, disregarding testimony from DOD General 
Counsel Jeh Johnson and Assistant Attorney General David Kris about its 
problematic status.355 Kris presciently warned “there is a significant risk that 
appellate courts will ultimately conclude that material support for terrorism is 
not a traditional law of war offense, thereby reversing hard-won convictions and 
leading to questions about the [commissions’] legitimacy.”356 
The specific application against Khadr further highlights the flawed nature 
of the charge. None of the conduct described shows any personal involvement 
with, or support for, actions actually proscribed by the law of war. He was 
accused of receiving military training, working with improvised explosive 
devices, and participating in a firefight with Afghan militia and U.S. troops.357 
The only basis for the charge was that he acted on behalf of an organization that 
had previously engaged in terrorism. But, as already noted, the law of war 
refuses to hold individual combatants responsible for the cause for which they 
fight,358 leaving them legally accountable only for their own acts. 
The D.C. Circuit initially rejected the retroactive application of this charge 
on statutory grounds in its direct review of Hamdan’s appeal before rebasing its 
decision on constitutional footing in al Bahlul,359 effectively invalidating its use 
at Guantánamo and requiring the government to reconsider every future 
prosecution in which it intended to apply it.360 
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5. Spying 
Khadr’s final charge, spying, was uniquely defective. First, the MCA’s 
definition of the offense is logically flawed. But even more basic is the fact that 
the conduct described in Khadr’s charge sheet serves as a bar to prosecution for 
this offense, suggesting either ignorance of, or contempt for, the law of war. 
MCA § 950t reads in relevant part: 
(27) SPYING.—Any person subject to this chapter who, in violation of the 
law of war and with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury 
of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign power, collects or attempts 
to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false 
pretenses, for the purpose of conveying such information to an enemy of the 
United States, or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy, shall be punished by 
death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter 
may direct.361 
Although the term spy is colloquially applied to those who commit 
espionage,362 the military offense of spying is unique. It is defined by the law of 
war, which authorizes punishment as a means of self-defense, but it is not a war 
crime. The spy does not violate international law and cannot be tried by any 
party other than the victim nation, unlike actual war criminals who may be 
subject to universal jurisdiction.363 Spies must thus be tried under some form of 
domestic law.364 Commanders commit no legal violation by employing spies; 
George Washington used them during the Revolution with no legal 
contradiction even while ordering trials and executions of their British 
counterparts.365 The MCA requirement that spying be “in violation of the law of 
war” is thus nonsensical. Perhaps the drafters meant “as defined by the law of 
war,” or perhaps they were simply ignorant of the law. But the result is a flawed 
statute incorporating an element that can rarely, if ever, be satisfied. 
Another unique aspect of the military offense is that a spy who is an enemy 
fighter must actually be caught behind the lines; a successful return to their side 
is a permanent bar to punishment.366 This is a long standing customary law rule 
                                                                                                                       
 361 10 U.S.C. § 950t(27) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 362 Espionage is currently defined in U.S. law at 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012), whereas the 
wartime offense of spying is proscribed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) at 
10 U.S.C. § 906 (2012). (Espionage committed by persons subject to U.S. military law is 
also addressed by the UCMJ at 10 U.S.C. § 906a (2012)). 
 363 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 210–11. 
 364 See, e.g., PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE 
WARFARE 42 (2009).  
 365 See generally ALEXANDER ROSE, WASHINGTON’S SPIES (2006). 
 366 This customary international law rule was codified by the Hague Land Warfare 
Regulations in 1899. Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
arts. 29–31, Oct. 18, 1907, 32 Stat. 1803; see DINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 211. 
2014] MILITARY COMMISSIONS’ EPIC FAIL 953 
 
included in virtually every major effort at explicating the law of war, ranging 
from the Lieber Code of 1863367 to AP I of 1977,368 as well as military manuals 
and treatises.369 
In Khadr’s case, it was not just the statutory definition that was at issue. 
According to his charge sheet, Khadr spied on U.S. convoys in June 2002, but 
then received “one month of land mine training” in July, effectively estopping 
the government from asserting that he was captured before rejoining his own 
forces.370 
Two other Guantánamo detainees have been charged with spying. 
Mohammed Hashim was unilaterally repatriated to Afghanistan in December 
2009 without ever facing trial.371 Majid Khan pleaded guilty to five charges, 
including spying, in a deal that requires him to testify for the government in 
future trials,372 even though he returned from his efforts at collecting 
information in the United States before his capture in Pakistan.373 
Because the charges preferred against Khadr include each offense used to 
convict any Guantánamo detainee to date, the concerns discussed in this section 
call into serious question the validity of every post-9/11 military commission 
conviction. 
B. Al Nashiri 
Al Nashiri allegedly coordinated the October 2000 suicide bombing attack 
on the USS Cole, almost a year before 9/11 and the subsequent AUMF 
enactment.374 He was detained by the CIA following his capture and reportedly 
subjected to tortures including waterboarding and mock executions.375 Al 
Nashiri faces nine charges: 
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(1) using treachery or perfidy 
(2) murder in violation of the law of war 
(3) attempted murder in violation of the law of war 
(4) terrorism 
(5) conspiracy 
(6) intentionally causing serious bodily injury 
(7) attacking civilians 
(8) attacking civilian objects 
(9) hijacking or hazarding a vessel or aircraft376 
The perfidy, murder in violation of the law of war, and intentionally causing 
serious bodily harm charges refer exclusively to the Cole attack, while the 
attempted murder charge has specifications relating to both the Cole and an 
earlier failed attack on the USS The Sullivans.377 The terrorism charge refers 
both to the Cole and a 2002 attack on the civilian French tanker MV Limburg.378 
The final three charges cite only the Limburg attack.379 The conspiracy charge 
relates to a multi-year effort, allegedly dating to 1996, to use small, explosive-
laden boats for terrorist attacks including the three specific attacks mentioned in 
the other charges.380 
This case is unique in several respects. If the allegations against him are 
true, al Nashiri is an actual terrorist unlike most of those prosecuted to date who 
have generally been either minor functionaries like Hamdan or more traditional 
foot soldiers, like Australian David Hicks, whose “crimes” included guarding a 
tank.381 Al Nashiri is accused of coordinating a major terrorist attack which 
killed seventeen U.S. Navy personnel, injured thirty-nine others, and did an 
estimated $250 million worth of damage to a front-line warship, placing it out 
of service for eighteen months.382 
There is little doubt that this alleged conduct can be prosecuted as a major 
crime under a number of different federal statutes. The Cole clearly falls within 
the federal courts’ “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” as a “vessel 
belonging . . . to the United States . . . .”383 An FBI agent involved in the 
investigation says that the government can make a fully admissible federal case 
notwithstanding the abusive CIA interrogations.384 
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Despite the obvious military nature of the Cole, commission jurisdiction, in 
contrast, is highly problematic given the timing of the attack and the fact that a 
warship is a paradigmatic example of a lawful target in an armed conflict. 
Prosecuting the bombing as an ordinary federal crime should simply require 
proving that al Nashiri was involved with the attack, which the law would treat 
as a prima facie unlawful use of force. Prosecuting it by a military commission 
invokes the additional burdens of proving (1) that it took place in the context of 
an armed conflict, and (2) that the attack actually violated law of war rules. 
1. Issues with Attack Timing and Scope of the Conflict 
Attack timing is a major issue with respect to the charges based on the Cole 
and the earlier failed attack on USS The Sullivans. Both took place well prior to 
9/11—the first time that the U.S. government declared itself to be in an armed 
conflict with al Qaeda. The Cole’s crew entered port in Aden, Yemen believing 
that it was executing a routine peacetime refueling stop.385 That does not 
preclude the attack from launching hostilities, just as U.S. forces began 
December 7, 1941, at peace. But unlike that “day of infamy,” which saw the 
immediate initiation of hostilities against Japan even before Congress declared 
war,386 and the award of fifteen Medals of Honor for heroic conduct at Pearl 
Harbor,387 the Cole attack was never treated as an act of war. The Navy’s 
official investigation describes the crew’s lack of threat awareness and assesses 
the ship’s compliance with the Standing Rules of Engagement and peacetime 
anti-terrorism rules,388 not the law of war. Although cruise missiles had been 
fired in response to several prior terrorist strikes, only FBI agents were launched 
in response to this bombing.389 No medals were awarded for combat heroism on 
the Cole; an individual falsely claiming to have been on board during the 
bombing was exposed in part because he illegitimately wore an award denoting 
combat valor.390 At least four crew members were awarded the Navy and 
                                                                                                                       
 385 See Kevin Ryan, The USS Cole: Twelve Years Later, No Justice or Understanding, 
DIG WITHIN (Oct. 7, 2012), http://digwithin.net/2012/10/07/the-uss-cole/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7VC3-X2GX. 
 386 See JOEL IRA HOLWITT, EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN 139–43 (2009) (documenting 
orders to conduct unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan within hours of the 
Pearl Harbor attack on December 7). Congress declared war on December 8, 1941. 
 387 Richard Goldstein, John Finn, Medal of Honor Winner, Dies at 100, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/us/28finn.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/LJA6-2U22. 
 388 See Memorandum from Captain, U.S. Navy, to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces 
Central Command, Command Investigation into the Actions of USS Cole (DDG 67) in 
Preparing For and Undertaking a Brief Stop for Fuel at Bandar At Tawahi (Aden Harbor) 
Aden, Yemen on or About 12 October 2000 (Nov. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Command 
Investigation] (on file with the author).  
 389 See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES 222–24 (2004). 
 390 Mark D. Faram & Lance M. Bacon, Navy: Cole Faker Wore Unearned Awards, 
NAVY TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009, 6:43 PM), http://www.navytimes.com/article/ 
956 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:5 
 
Marine Corps Medal, which the Navy officially specifies as “the senior 
peacetime award for heroism.”391 President William Clinton spoke at a formal 
memorial service for the fallen crew members, declaring that “[t]heir tragic loss 
reminds us that even when America is not at war, the men and women of our 
military still risk their lives for peace.”392 The Chief of Naval Operation’s final 
endorsement on the Navy’s investigation, written months after the attack, noted 
the certainty of future terrorist attacks even as the Navy was “performing our 
peacetime mission.”393 This consistent official U.S. government treatment of the 
attack should estop prosecution of its perpetrators under the law of war. 
Charges based on the botched effort to strike the USS The Sullivans ten 
months earlier are even more problematic.394 That effort failed so prematurely 
that the crew was never aware it had happened.395 
The Limburg charges raise different questions about the scope of conflict. 
That October 6, 2002, event postdates the recognized initiation of U.S. 
hostilities with al Qaeda. But, it is unclear that a terrorist attack on a French-
flagged vessel under Malaysian charter in the Gulf of Aden constitutes part of 
any armed conflict, let alone one invoking the jurisdiction of a U.S. military 
commission. The French government recognized 9/11 as an armed attack and 
aided U.S. efforts against al Qaeda and the Taliban.396 France more recently 
intervened in Mali; President Francois Hollande termed events there a “war” 
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against “terrorists.”397 But France made no military response to the Limburg 
attack, terming it only an act of terrorism.398 This renders associated 
prosecutions by U.S. military commissions extremely problematic. 
There is no similar issue with regular federal prosecution, however. The 
attack falls within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2280, “[v]iolence against maritime 
navigation,”399 enacted in 1994 to fulfill U.S. obligations under the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation.400 It only requires that “the offender is later found in the United 
States” to exercise federal criminal jurisdiction.401 
The issue of whether the Limburg bombing was associated with an armed 
conflict impacts three of al Nashiri’s charges. But, the same issue would be 
dispositive with respect to the commission charges al Darbi pleaded guilty to in 
February 2014, which are based entirely on that incident.402 
2. The Problem with Perfidy 
Even the Cole attack is not the clear-cut law of war violation commonly 
assumed, despite allegations of “perfidy.”403 The charge sheet asserts that the 
bombers sought to deceive the Cole’s crew into believing that they were 
“entitled to protection under the law of war” by being “dressed in civilian 
clothing, waving at the crewmembers . . . and operating a civilian boat . . . .”404 
But this was a year before the U.S. government first applied the law of war to 
combating terrorism, and the Cole crew was operating under peacetime rules. 
How can sailors who do not know that they are at war be induced to accord 
protection under the law of war? Logically, that should be fatal to the 
application of this charge. 
Close reading of the Navy’s investigation reveals that several sailors may 
have mistakenly believed the boat was coming to pick up garbage, but there is 
nothing suggesting that the attackers deliberately encouraged this belief, or even 
benefitted from it.405 While those behind the attack can (and should) be held 
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responsible for a peacetime act of terrorism, an attacker is not liable for his 
enemy’s lack of alertness during armed conflict. The investigating officer found 
significant shortcomings in the crew’s readiness and threat awareness, including 
failure to comply with several mandatory anti-terrorism security measures such 
as stationing a watch on the ship’s bridge.406 Extreme vigilance is required in a 
conflict, particularly because naval warfare rules allow approaching an intended 
target under a false flag, so long as the attacker’s “true colors” were shown 
before actually opening fire.407 It is possible that the boat might have displayed 
an al Qaeda logo or flag;408 it seems unlikely that anyone on board would have 
recognized one if it did. While the law of the sea calls for warships to bear 
distinguishing marks, naval crews are not required to have uniforms.409 The 
United States government will look foolish if the prosecution comes down to an 
allegation that having waved to an adversary now constitutes a war crime. 
3. Issue with the Terrorism Charge 
The application of the terrorism charge to the Cole attack is also highly 
problematic. The MCA provides this definition:  
(24) TERRORISM.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally 
kills or inflicts great bodily harm on one or more protected persons, or 
intentionally engages in an act that evinces a wanton disregard for human life, 
in a manner calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government or 
civilian population by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against 
government conduct, shall be punished, . . . as a military commission under 
this chapter may direct.410 
This language requires either that the victims be “protected persons” or that 
the violence be “wanton”; in either case it must “be calculated to influence or 
affect” a government or civilian population “by intimidation or 
coercion . . . .”411 
The “protected person” prong is inapplicable for two reasons. This term has 
no legal status outside of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applicable to armed 
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conflict between two or more state parties; it is not used in Common Article 3 
dealing with non-international conflict. The MCA acknowledges that: “[t]he 
term ‘protected person’ means any person entitled to protection under one or 
more of the Geneva Conventions . . . .”412 The term thus has no legal meaning 
outside the context of the Conventions, and the government has determined that 
these treaties do not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda.413 But even if the 
Conventions did apply, a warship crew is not “protected” unless the ship 
surrenders or sinks.414 Al Nashiri’s charge sheet thus necessarily adopts the 
alternate MCA definition, alleging that the Cole attack “evinced a wanton 
disregard for human life. . . .”415 
Wanton must mean more than “deliberate,” however, or else the statute 
would purport to criminalize every wartime killing.416 Indeed, wartime use of 
force, not ultimately intended to coerce a government, would be gratuitous 
violence failing to meet the law of war’s “necessity” principle.417 To accurately 
reflect the law of war, “wanton” must connote a resort to violence that is 
unjustified by the circumstances of the conflict and committed to satisfy 
personal bloodlust or that involves impermissible savagery such as the 
deliberate infliction of unnecessary suffering. This imposes a substantial burden 
of proof beyond that required for a federal criminal prosecution, because even 
military personnel have a right to life outside of armed conflict, and any killing 
is a crime. 
Moreover, treating the Cole attack as an incident of armed conflict risks 
establishing a precedent detrimental to long-term U.S. interests and the safety of 
our military personnel. To establish the existence of an armed conflict prior to 
9/11, the prosecution must rely on Osama bin Laden’s calls for violence against 
the United States as an effective “declaration of war.” Conceding this traditional 
state prerogative to non-state actors opens a Pandora’s Box. It logically accords 
future terrorist groups the right to proclaim hostilities against the United States 
at a time of their choice; they would then be exempt from criminal 
accountability if they simply adopted law of war compliant means; e.g., by 
placing distinctive markings on a vessel and flying their organization’s flag 
before striking. Classifying events like the Cole attack as ordinary terrorism, on 
the other hand, stigmatizes the perpetrators as criminals rather than warriors and 
entitles the United States to call upon other nations for legal cooperation under 
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anti-terrorism treaties.418 There is no similar obligation with respect to an armed 
conflict; indeed armed conflict creates the possibility of other nations 
considering themselves to be neutrals bound to avoid assisting either side. 
Prosecuting al Nashiri by military commission is thus both legally 
problematic and increases the future risk to U.S. forces. It is unclear whether the 
government has considered these factors in deciding how to prosecute him. 
C. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and the 9/11 “Co-conspirators” 
The most prominent commission defendant, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, 
and his four co-defendants419 face eight charges, all specifically related to the 
9/11 attacks: 
(1) conspiracy 
(2) attacking civilians 
(3) attacking civilian objects 
(4) murder in violation of the law of war 
(5) destruction of property in violation of the law of war 
(6) hijacking or hazarding a vessel 
(7) terrorism 
(8) intentionally causing serious bodily injury420 
This prosecution rests on the strongest legal grounds of any Guantánamo 
case to date, yet still has real flaws. Unlike the Cole attack, the President 
promptly identified 9/11 as an act of war;421 Congress and much of the 
international community quickly concurred.422 And no credible commentator 
would contend that hijacked passenger-carrying civilian airliners constitute 
legitimate weapons. Nevertheless, there are very significant practical and legal 
disadvantages implicated by a law of war-based 9/11 military tribunal that 
federal trials would avoid entirely.  
Treated as acts of terrorism, virtually every aspect of the 9/11 attack 
constitutes validly prosecutable crimes. The hijacking of four aircraft, the 
killing of each passenger and crew member onboard, the attacks on the World 
                                                                                                                       
 418 See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 8, 
Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; see also Text and Status of the United Nations 
Conventions on Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml (last visited Nov. 3, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BBM9-NYBE. 
 419 The other four are Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek Bin’Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, 
Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Adan al Hawasawi. See, e.g., Charge Sheet at 1–
20, United States v. Mohammad, Charge Sheet (Military Comm’ns Trial Judiciary Apr. 14, 
2012). 
 420 Id. 
 421 Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity 
with the National Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010912-4.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y87T-SQ49. 
 422 See, e.g., Glazier, supra note 286, at 957, 986.  
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Trade Center and Pentagon, and every resulting death or injury on the ground 
can each constitute separate federal counts. Liability for related inchoate 
offenses of solicitation, conspiracy, and attempted commission is well 
established, as well as various forms of participations such as being an 
accessory before or after the fact. If treated as “ordinary” terrorists, the 
defendants would essentially be limited to challenging the admissibility and 
factual sufficiency of the evidence against them. Military commission use, in 
contrast, renders virtually every aspect of the unproven trial procedure and 
substantive law open to judicial challenge, and permits the assertion of unique 
law of war defenses. 
A law of war prosecution is contingent upon the existence of an armed 
conflict between al Qaeda and the United States. But, once a conflict begins, 
specialized law of war rules trump both ordinary domestic law and conflicting 
international human rights law under the lex specialis principle.423 Conducting 
an attack is then insufficient to give rise to penal liability; the attack must be 
proven to have violated specific conflict rules which have associated criminal 
sanctions. Many, perhaps even most, acts that technically contravene law of war 
rules are not recognized war crimes.424 
1. The Pentagon and World Trade Center as Lawful Targets? 
The Pentagon, like the Cole, is obviously a valid target during an armed 
conflict. But, it can colorably be argued that the World Trade Center was a 
lawful target as well. While the law of war limits attacks to “military objects,” 
that term is broader than a literal reading might suggest, extending to “objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”425 
Many authorities interpret this to include objects with significant economic 
value. Matthew Waxman, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Detainee Affairs between 2005 and 2007, explained in a 2000 Rand study 
that “[t]he United States generally supports interpretations of ‘military 
objectives’ that include economic targets and infrastructure because their 
destruction is sometimes thought to undermine an adversary’s ability to sustain 
operations as well as its will to do so.”426 
Waxman cites a number of reputable sources for this assertion, including 
both official Air Force and Navy publications, U.S. law of war expert Michael 
N. Schmitt (currently chairman of the International Law Department at the 
Naval War College), and General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander 
                                                                                                                       
 423 DINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 23–24. 
 424 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 300, at 272. 
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during NATO’s 1999 Kosovo air campaign.427 The validity of economic 
targeting has also been advocated by long-time U.S. government law of war 
expert Hays Parks. He notes that during the Vietnam War, the U.S. refrained 
from attacking a number of lawful targets for “political” reasons, including 
“economic targets not directly associated with the military effort.”428 Parks’ 
views are significant as he is the primary driver behind the draft DOD Law of 
War Manual.429 It would surely embarrass the government to have the 9/11 
defense call both the DOD official responsible for Guantánamo when Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammad arrived there and its recently retired senior law of war 
expert in order to extract admissions that their own work supported the 
conclusion that the twin towers were lawful targets at the time that al Qaeda 
was planning the attack. The defense could call al Bahlul (or use hearsay rules 
to admit trial transcripts) to show that bin Laden specifically requested an 
assessment of the economic damage resulting from 9/11.430 And the 
government’s prior defenses of its pseudo-documentary The Al Qaida Plan 
should facilitate the defense’s use of its footage stating that the 9/11 targets 
were selected for “the military, psychological and economic impact their hitting 
would have . . . .”431 In other words, al Qaeda apparently applied the criteria 
that Waxman articulated for lawful targeting. This could constitute a defense to 
specifications of the “attacking civilian objects” and “destruction of property in 
violation of the law of war” charges based on attacking the buildings. 
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There is another problem with the attacking civilian objects charge—
although it is a well-established war crime in international conflicts, it is not 
clear that attacking civilian objects constitutes a recognized non-international 
offense. The charge is conspicuously absent, for example, from the list of non-
international war crimes detailed in the Rome Statute, meaning that states 
declined to let the ICC exercise jurisdiction over it.432 So, any application of 
this charge may become even more problematic once the commissions address 
the legal obligation to classify the conflict. 
2. Mass Murders or “Collateral Damage”? 
The loss of nearly 3,000 lives represents the real tragedy of 9/11, not the 
physical destruction. The Pentagon was restored to its original appearance and 
the twin towers have been replaced with the new 1,776 foot-tall One World 
Trade Center. Commission officials implicitly recognize this, listing each 
individual victim in the charging documents, maintaining a “Victims and 
Family Members” section on the commissions’ website,433 and flying survivors 
to Guantánamo at government expense for each hearing.434 
But while a federal prosecution would respectfully treat each individual as a 
murder victim, a law of war trial predictably requires the defense to assert that 
9/11 civilian deaths were merely permissible “collateral damage.” The law of 
war requires attackers to distinguish between “military” and “civilian” objects 
but excuses the infliction of civilian deaths and property damage during 
otherwise lawful attacks so as long as the anticipated losses are 
“not . . . excessive in relation to the expected military advantage.”435 Given 
9/11’s profound economic and psychological impact, it can be plausibly 
asserted that the civilian losses were permissible, particularly considering the 
massive collateral damage resulting from many past American air attacks 
abroad. This is potentially a valid defense to the charges of murder and 
attacking civilians with respect to the large number of victims on the ground, 
and a complete defense to the intentionally causing serious bodily injury charge 
because there were no survivors on the planes. 
3. Other Substantive Law Issues 
The conspiracy charge faces the same issues identified in the D.C. Circuit’s 
consideration of al Bahlul. Chief Prosecutor Martins’s request that the 
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convening authority dismiss it was denied.436 The prosecution then concurred 
with a defense motion asking the judge to dismiss the conspiracy charge, 
provided it could amend the charging document to preserve allegations of 
participation in a common plan, in other words, to move from conspiracy as a 
stand-alone offense to conspiracy as a mode of liability for the other charged 
offenses.437 
International criminal trials have recognized various forms of contributory 
liability, so the prosecution’s approach is not without legal support. But it is 
complicated by the fact that different tribunals have taken different approaches. 
The ICTY, for example, established “Joint Criminal Enterprise” (JCE) to 
describe this liability and established a body of jurisprudence explicating it.438 
The Rome Statute, in contrast, recognizes liability for “a crime by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose,”439 declining to adopt the JCE 
formulation. Although functionally similar, the differences demonstrate a lack 
of unified international agreement. Contributory liability will necessarily be 
subject to extensive argument and lengthy appeals if Guantánamo convictions 
are based on it. 
Charging “terrorism” as a substantive military commission offense is also 
problematic given the issues with the MCA’s definition of the offense discussed 
earlier. Moreover, this specific offense is not generally recognized as a stand-
alone crime in international law.440 This is also true of the “hijacking or 
hazarding a vessel or aircraft” offense. That charge represents an odd 
amalgamation of “hijacking” (aircraft piracy) from federal law and “hazarding a 
vessel” from the UCMJ.441 Interference with aviation or maritime safety is a 
significant concern of the international community, but the response was 
treaties requiring nations to criminalize these offenses under domestic law442 
rather than defining new international crimes. Although these acts are clearly 
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established federal crimes, military prosecution in reliance on the law of war is 
problematic. 
Trying the alleged 9/11 defendants under the law of war is logically 
permissible given the legal recognition of that event as an armed attack. But 
doing so credibly requires proving the commission of recognized war crimes 
applicable to the conflict typology. One area in which the Nuremberg legacy is 
legitimately challenged is its use of “crimes against peace” and “crimes against 
humanity” charges without clear prior definition of these offenses. The 
international community’s response was quite clear—it quickly included 
explicit prohibitions against ex post facto crime creation in both the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights443 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.444 
The Rome Statute is explicit that its offenses only apply prospectively.445 To 
have any hope of credibility, the Guantánamo trials must recognize that the 
validity of charges levied is now an essential component of international justice. 
No modern tribunal can ever again hope to get the “benefit of the doubt” 
accorded the IMT, particularly when alternative courts with respected procedure 
and established substantive law are readily available. 
To date, the Guantánamo commissions have failed to meet these 
obligations, undermining their own legitimacy. Moreover, reliance on law of 
war charges permits the invocation of unique law of war defenses which work 
to these defendants’ advantage. So even where a law of war trial is legally 
permissible, practical considerations may still suggest that it is not wise to 
conduct one. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Military commission proceedings under the 2009 MCA are a substantial 
improvement over those originally envisioned by the Bush Administration, but 
they still fall short of acceptable due process standards. Despite the statutory 
ban on coerced statements, detainee mistreatment issues continue to permeate 
almost every aspect of the commission process.446 Prosecutors seem determined 
to use detainee statements as their primary evidence, disregarding documented 
detainee abuse and the MCA’s prohibitions against coerced statements. 
Ignoring Nuremberg Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson’s insistence on the need 
for evidence beyond question of taint, government prosecutors rely on the 
premise of “clean team” procedures notwithstanding efforts to induce “learned 
helpless.” The commissions’ adversarial nature then effectively shifts the 
burden of keeping tainted evidence out to the defense while the government 
controls the information necessary to do so. 
                                                                                                                       
 443 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), art. 11 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 444 See Geneva III, supra note 128, art. 99. 
 445 Rome Statute, supra note 133, arts. 22, 24. 
 446 See Savage, supra note 295. 
966 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:5 
 
Concurrently, commission classification rules—designed to shield the 
coercers—compromise the ability of defense attorneys to adequately represent 
their clients. These disadvantages are further compounded by the lack of any 
right to representation by freely chosen counsel and structural and resource 
inequalities between prosecution and defense, including restrictions on access to 
witnesses and the ability to obtain expert assistance. 
These procedural issues are just the tip of the legal iceberg. Far too little 
attention has been paid to the legitimacy of the basic charges. Without valid 
jurisdiction, any trial is a legal nullity, and procedure becomes irrelevant. To 
survive legal challenge, Guantánamo charges must be soundly grounded in law 
of war violations defined at the time of the alleged conduct and applicable to the 
type of conflict being contested. The problematic charges of conspiracy and 
providing material support for terrorism, the former now clearly rejected by the 
D.C. Circuit and the latter in substantial doubt, have been charged in seven of 
eight cases completed to date, and were the only offenses charged in five of 
these. Additional charges lodged against the remaining defendants either failed 
to state a recognized law of war violation or the alleged conduct fails to fall 
within the legitimate jurisdiction of a law of war commission. The perverse 
irony is that the “war crime” most likely to have actually been present in any of 
the completed Guantánamo case seems to have been denial of a fair trial, and 
the perpetrator was the government, not the defendant. 
The situation is little better with respect to the capital cases now fitfully 
moving towards trial. These charges also have potentially serious defects while 
law of war prosecutions present unique practical downsides entirely avoided by 
using established federal courts. 
The military commissions have been tried for a full decade under two 
different administrations and have consistently failed to clear any credible legal 
bar due to their shortcomings in both procedure and substantive law. 
Meanwhile, federal courts have returned scores of terrorist convictions without 
legitimate controversy, and with none of the commissions’ jurisdictional flaws. 
The most recent of these, that of Osama bin Laden’s son-in-law, Sulaiman Abu 
Ghayth, led Attorney General Holder to observe: 
This verdict is a major milestone in the government’s unrelenting efforts to 
pursue justice against those involved with the September 11 attacks. . . . It was 
appropriate that this defendant, who publicly rejoiced over the attacks on the 
World Trade Center, faced trial in the shadow of where those buildings once 
stood. We never doubted the ability of our Article III court system to 
administer justice swiftly in this case, as it has in hundreds of other cases 
involving terrorism defendants. It would be a good thing for the country if this 
case has the result of putting that political debate to rest. This outcome 
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vindicates the government’s approach to securing convictions against not only 
this particular defendant, but also other senior leaders of al Qaeda.447 
Continued use of the Guantánamo commissions, in contrast, only plays into 
the hands of our adversaries, fueling their recruiting and fundraising efforts 
while deterring legal cooperation from other nations and further tarnishing the 
United States’ reputation as a nation respecting the rule of law. 
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